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Historians have expressed a variety of opinions concerning the true 
significance of the Congress of Berlin. While the 1878 meeting did not have 
to deal with questions as comprehensive as those discussed in Vienna in 
1814-1815 or at Paris in 1856, the Congress of Berlin had great impact in its 
own right. While the Berlin meeting made decisions in order to reorganize 
the Balkans after years of instability and war, it also created a split in 
relations between the German Empire and Imperial Russia which would 
eventually drive the two powers towards conflict in "The Great War" in 
1914. 
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To understand the positions taken by the Great Powers and the 
decisions made at the Congress, the thesis describes the nationalist 
uprisings which exploded in the Balkans in 1875, when many of the Balkan 
peoples revolted against the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Turks. Despite 
the effort of the Great Powers to calm the violence, the situation 
deteriorated. After an unsuccessful war by Serbia and Montenegro for 
liberation from Turkey, the Russians decided to settle the situation 
themselves through war against the Turks in 1877-1878. Under the banner 
of Slavic unity, the Russians thoroughly defeated the Turks, and then 
dictated the harsh peace of San Stefano. At San Stefano, the Russians 
attempted to solve "The Eastern Question" unilaterally by creating a 
Southeastern Europe under Russian and Slavic domination. 
However, statesmen elsewhere in Europe saw the Treaty of San 
Stefano as upsetting the balance of power in Europe. This was especially a 
concern for Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. For several months 
England prepared for war against Russia. It was in this tense atmosphere 
that the Congress of Berlin met in 1878. 
The thesis then focuses on the Congress itself, which basically 
sought to reverse the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano and create a new 
balance of power in the Balkans. Under the leadership of German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the Congress eventually agreed on the 
Treaty of Berlin, thus avoiding a European war. This agreement created 
several new independent countries (including a divided Bulgaria), granted 
Austria-Hungary the right to occupy the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and settled questions concerning the Black Sea, the Danube River, and 
Northern Armenia. This solution allowed Europe to remain at peace for 
over thirty years. 
However, the impact of these decisions had serious consequences on 
German-Russian relations, as Tsarist officials blamed Germany for 
allowing England and Austria-Hungary to win major concessions at the 
Congress. And despite a long-standing friendship, the Tsar threatened a 
war of retaliation against Germany. This sudden crisis helped solidify the 
growing close relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in 
October 1879, a defensive alliance was signed by the two German powers. 
This would prove to be the first alliance in the slow build-up of tensions 
leading to World War I. 
Thus, this thesis undertakes to show that the Congress of Berlin 
should rightly be considered a major watershed in European diplomatic 
history. Not only did the Congress produce a respectable solution for "The 
Eastern Question," but without intending it, also created a irreconcilable 
split in German-Russian relations, while encouraging Germany and 
Austria-Hungary to form a military alliance. These last points would be 
crucial in creating an atmosphere necessary for a major war in August 
1914. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historians have had differing opinions on the significance of the 1878 
Congress of Berlin. George E. Buckle made that clear by stating 
the Congress of Berlin, with its resulting treaty, is a 
landmark in the diplomatic history of the Nineteenth 
Century; but of the real value and importance of its 
work, there have been very varying appreciations. I 
Indeed, there seems to be no real agreement on the Congress, as W. N. 
Medlicott wrote, "in reality, the Congress was an exercise in guesswork 
and make-believe for all the powers."2 Commenting on the ensuing Treaty 
of Berlin, J. A. Marriott noted that "the enduring significance of the treaty 
is to be found .. .in the new nations which were arising upon the ruins of 
that [Ottoman] Empire."3 However, L. S. Stavrianos completely disagreed: 
an essential feature of the treaty was its disregard of 
ethnic and nationalist considerations ... For the Balkan 
peoples, then the Treaty of Berlin meant frustration of 
nationalist aspirations and future wars.4 
1 George Earle Buckle, Life QfBenjamin Disrael, 1876-1881, vol. 6 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), 310. 
2 W. N. Medlicott, IM Con~ess !l!Berlin .and .Afifil:--A Diplomatic 
Histox:y Qf ~ ~ Eastern Settlement. 1878-1880, 134. 
3 J. A. R. Marriott, '.Ille. Eastern Question--A Studv in European 
Diplomacy, 4th ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 345. 
4 L. S. Stavrianos, ~Balkans. 1815-1914 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
Winston, 1963), 70-71. 
With such varying opinions on the 1878 Congress and on the decisions 
made there, then it should be a fascinating topic to study. 
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To recognize the importance of the Congress, consider the fact that 
the meeting took place in a crucial period of European history, as many 
changes had recently occurred on the continent. For instance, the Berlin 
Congress was the first major international meeting after the unification of 
Germany. This is imperative to keep in mind, for the defeat of France had 
made united Germany the most powerful country in Western Europe after 
1871. The fact that the Congress was held in Berlin reflected Germany's 
new power, as before 1871, such crucial meetings were held in some city 
such as Paris, London, or Vienna. 
Some very prominent individuals who are still greatly admired and 
studied played major roles at Berlin, and they also signify the importance of 
the meeting. Foremost among those figures was the distinguished 
German Chancellor, Prince Otto von Bismarck. Since Bismarck acted as 
the president of the Berlin proceedings, and since the other delegates 
accepted Bismarck's solution of partitioning the Ottoman Empire in order 
to maintain European peace, it can be argued that the 1878 Congress 
represented Bismarck's height of influence and power in Europe. There 
were other famous individuals at that meeting, such as British Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli, and Lord Robert Salisbury, the then British 
Foreign Minister and future Prime Minister. Also there was the Austro-
Hungarian Foreign Secretary Count Julius Andrassy, a man who played a 
decisive role in the Congress. Meanwhile, the Russian Ambassador to 
London, Count Peter Shuvalov, eventually gained the most respect of the 
Russian delegation in the eyes of the other delegates. This is despite the 
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fact that Shuvalov did not hold the highest position in the Russian 
commission. These individuals and others will be discussed as well in this 
historical study. 
The decisions made at the 1878 meeting were also important. The 
Congress' main goal was to solve "The Eastern Question," that is, 
determining who would control Southeastern Europe after the Ottoman 
Empire lost control of their territories in the Balkans. Indeed, the Congress 
was successful in creating a generally peaceful situation in Southeastern 
Europe which lasted for over thirty years. The Congress of Berlin also 
represented another attempt to solve major continental problems by 
"Conference Diplomacy." 
Conference Diplomacy dates from the beginning of the 
western state-system at the Congress of Westphalia 
[1642-1648], which ended the Thirty-Years War. It was 
used with increased frequency in th Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries. 5 
These conferences were "large-scale multilateral diplomatic negotiations 
conducted at international meetings."6 But a "Congress" was the highest 
level meeting that existed in the diplomatic world, as a Congress would 
convene only to discuss a very specific topic, and it would include the 
highest-ranking representatives of all the European powers, all of whom 
5 Jack S. Plano and Roy Olton,~ International Relations 
Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), 212. 
6 Ibid., 212. 
would be equal in voting power while at the Congress. 7 There would be 
other conferences after Berlin, but never with the title of "Congress." 
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One nation that tried to take advantage of Germany's new power at 
the Congress was Russia. Traditionally, Russia and Prussia had always 
had close ties, and after German unification, Russia hoped to use 
Germany's strength to achieve some of her long-held foreign objectives. 
Thus, when the Congress convened in Berlin, Tsarist officials expected 
Germany to continue to support Russia as she always had done before. But 
when the decisions made at Berlin did not satisfy the Tsar, Russian 
officials believed that they had been deserted by Germany. Worst yet, the 
Tsar thought that Germany had given her full support to Russia's rival in 
the Balkans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Tsar never fully forgave 
Germany for her actions in 1878, and so after the Berlin Congress, 
Russian-German relations were never quite the same again. 
Thus, in looking for a root cause for war in 1914 between Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, then one must seriously consider the 
Congress of Berlin of 1878, as this was the turning point where relations 
between these three nations noticeably started to deteriorate. As before 
1878, these three powers had made up the Three Emperors' League CDfil: 
Dreikaiserbund), an association started in 1873 (and renewed in 1881) of 
friendship, ideology, and cooperation. Although the three states were never 
formally allied, there were many long-standing links between them. 
7 This type of Congress should not be confused with the 'Congress 
System' "instituted by Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, 
Austria, Prussia and Russia, signed in Paris in 1815." For soon, England 
withdrew from this system, and then it finally collapsed by 1825. A. W. 
Palmer, A Dictionary Qf Modern History. 1789-1945 (London: The Cresset 
Press, 1962), 68. 
Although no doubt many differences existed within the Dreikaiserbund, 
none of them was so serious that negotiations could not solve them. But 
when Russia perceived, rightly or wrongly, that it was Germany which 
blocked the achievement of their goals at the Congress in 1878, then the 
Tsar spoke openly for the first time of attacking his western neighbors in 
retaliation. 
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While the 1878 meeting started the degeneration in relations between 
Russia and Germany, the Berlin Congress also represented the 
corresponding solidification of relations between Germany and Austria-
Hungary. For these two nations signed a defensive military alliance in 
1879, soon after the Tsar had made his war threats known. This close 
friendship between the two German powers lasted until 1918. 
Thus, the purpose of this historical investigation is to portray the 1878 
Congress of Berlin as a particularly significant event in European 
diplomacy, not only because of the decisions that it took towards solving the 
"Eastern Question," but also as a root cause of later Russo-German 
antagonism (which eventually erupted in 1914) and the Austro-German 
alliance of 1879. 
But in order to study the Congress of Berlin fully, the situation in 
Europe leading up to the Congress must be presented and understood. This 
means analyzing the crucial shifts in Europe after 1871, as well as the 
uprisings in the Balkans starting in 1875. The resulting Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-1878 will also then be reviewed, for it was the reaction to the 
outcome of this war that forced the Congress to be called. 
The focus of this investigation will then shift to the meeting itself in 
1878, the powers and individuals of the Congress, and the decisions made. 
Finally, the consequences of the Congress as well as the reactions to the 
meeting will be examined, including the signing of the Dual Alliance. 
Thus, this thesis aims to inform the reader in detail of the events 
concerning the Congress of Berlin of 1878, as well as the ramifications 
associated with it. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, BEFORE 1875 
In order to understand the Congress of Berlin fully, it is necessary to 
consider the positions of the powers that participated in the meeting. This 
is especially important because many aims and policies of the Great Powers 
had shifted in the years prior to the 1878 Congress, mainly because of the 
significant changes to the European continent. 
For a period after the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, Europe for the 
most part remained relatively unchanged, since the major powers at that 
meeting had agreed to create a balance of power and to work together to 
maintain that system as much as possible. For a generation, this 
arrangement worked, as it was mutually beneficial for all the Great 
Powers. That long-standing order was seriously tested for the first time by 
Imperial Russia, when they attempted expansion into the Ottoman Empire 
during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. It was mainly the cooperation of 
Great Britain and France which managed to stop the Russian quest to 
dominate the Balkan region. For it was the main task of the European 
Concert created at Vienna to stop any attempt by a single power or a 
coalition to gain a commanding position on the continent. The 1856 Treaty 
of Paris, which ended the Crimean War, recreated a balance in the 
Balkans, strengthened the position of the Ottoman Empire in Europe once 
again, and greatly weakened Imperial Russia's ability to attempt a similar 
attack later. In the 1856 treaty, Russia was "forbidden to maintain naval 
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forces in the Black Sea or to build ... arsenals on its shores ... [and] Russia 
was required to cede to Moldavia three districts of Southern Bessarabia. "8 
However, the Treaty of Paris did not create the long-lasting peace that 
the powers thought it would. Rather, "the Crimean War left Europe in an 
anarchical situation in which more powers were interested in revising 
what was left of the balance than were interested in preserving it. "9 As for 
the defeated nation, after 1856, Russia "neglected everything in Europe for 
the sake of her national interests. Or rather, for the sake of her national 
honor."10 This meant that Russia would do all that it could to destroy the 
humiliating Treaty of Paris. 
In order to do this, Russia first launched necessary large-scale 
reforms in society and government, and she also rebuilt her army. To 
carry this out, she more or less isolated herself from European affairs to 
make these improvements. While in this isolation, they allowed changes to 
be made on the European map. The Tsarist government did not forget that 
their long-time ideological friend, Austria, had not come to their aid in the 
Crimean War and, in fact, even forced the Tsar to sue for peace. With this 
in mind, Russia thought Austria deserved punishment. The first sign of 
this came with the unification of the Italian peninsula in the 1860's, in 
8 Barbara Jelavich, TM Ottoman Empire, The Great Powers, .and~ 
Straits Questions, 1870-1887 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press), 20. 
9 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force .and Statecraft-
Diplomatic Problems 2f Qm: Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983), 36. 
10 A. J.P. Taylor,~ Stru~~le Em: Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 
(Oxford, England: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1954), 90-91. 
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which Italy gained lands from Austria by diplomacy and war. The 
Russians manifested their anger a second time when they did not interfere 
with Prussia's defeat of Austria in 1866. Thus, the decision not to help the 
Russians in Crimea had come back to haunt the Austrians. 
Austria was not the only power which provoked the Russian desire 
for revenge. Tsar Alexander II also despised France for its role in the 
Crimea, and when Prussia defeated France in a stunning fashion in 1870-
1871, Russia did nothing to prevent it. With the Prussian victory over 
France, the long-awaited unification of Germany was completed. The Tsar 
thought he could use the new Germany as a way to obtain some of his 
foreign policy objectives. But it was not long after German unification that 
the Tsar realized that the new Germany was more powerful--and 
threatening--than he had anticipated. This was especially a concern for 
Russian Foreign Secretary Alexander Gorchakov, who did not trust 
Bismarck. 
The unification of Germany into a single nation-state had profound 
impacts in the European balance of power, a change that would last until 
1918 and beyond. The rapid German military victory over France had 
proven beyond the doubt that the dominance of the French army had ended. 
With the military victory, Germany (which now also included the annexed 
French provinces of Alsace-Lorraine) became the most powerful nation in 
Europe west of Russia. But with these developments for Germany also 
came responsibility, as she was forced to assume France's role as the 
center of European diplomacy, whether they wanted it or not. That would 
be a great burden for the new state, but luckily, German policy was guided 
by the brilliant Chancellor, Prince Otto van Bismarck, who was well-
qualified to master such a position as that of the continent's leading 
diplomat. Yet even he would soon find that such a position had many 
potential problems. 
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After the French defeat by Prussia, their Emperor Napoleon III 
abdicated, and the Third Republic was proclaimed. This change fit in 
perfectly with Bismarck's designs. For as long as Germany held the two 
French provinces (Alsace-Lorraine), Bismarck feared for a French 
nationalist drive to retake the regions. However, in Bismarck's eyes, such 
an attempt was far less likely under a democratically-elected government 
than under a possibly ambitious and nationalistic monarchy. Thus, 
Bismarck openly expressed his wish that France should 
choose not restoration [of the monarchy], but remain a 
republic. This form of government .. .in Bismarck's 
view, best calculated to perpetuate French isolation and 
weakness. I I 
A constant effort to keep France isolated from the rest of Europe became the 
basis--and perhaps obsession--of Bismarck's foreign policy.I2 
However, France's isolation after 1871 was not all of Bismarck's 
work. The real and symbolic loss in power and status lost them many 
friends and admirers. "What France had lost was not so much two 
provinces, as the primacy of Europe ... the lost provinces were a symbol of 
lost greatness. "I3 To remedy this problem of isolation, France decided to 
11 W.R. Fryer and B. Litt, "The Republic and the Iron Chancellor: 
The Pattern of French-German Relations, 1841-1890," Royal Historical 
Transactions 29 (1979): 177. 
I2 Bismarck agreed with Russian Ambassador Pete Shuvalov, that he 
had constant nightmares about a possible hostile coalition against 
Germany: Otto Furst von Bismarck, Gedanken l!llil Errinnerun~en Zweiter 
Band (Stuttgart, J. G. Cottasche Buchlandlung, 1915), 269. 
13 Fryer and Litt, 171. 
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temporarily accept the new situation and not involve themselves in serious 
international disputes. In this manner, France chose to allow the Three 
Northern Powers to deal with the Eastern Question alone, hoping that the 
members of the Dreikaiserbund would fight among themselves over their 
conflicting ideas in Southeastern Europe. If this had happened, then 
France envisioned that the Three Emperors' League might well have 
collapsed over these disagreements. 
Austria, too, had long played an important role in European 
diplomacy, and in maintaining the Concert of Europe.14 But the Austrian 
defeat by Prussia meant that its dominating position in Germany had 
finally come to a close with the Treaty of Prague in 1866. However, a hope of 
revenge was held by many Austrians who had been active in the 
government for a long time. 
The collapse of the German settlement of the Treaty of 
Prague was in no sense a foregone conclusion. 
[Austrian Foreign Minister Count Frederick] Beust's 
German policy for involving Austria-Hungary was by no 
means a proven failure.15 
But any real chance of that vanished with the 1871 French defeat. "Austria 
was cooperative with France and hostile to Germany until Sedan, and then 
after Sedan, she became hostile toward France and cooperative with 
14 The Austrian belief in maintaining the conservative order and 
balance of power had dominated their foreign policy since the Congress of 
Vienna of 1815. Winfried Baumgart, Y2m Europaischen Konzert z..u.m 
Vt>lkerbund (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 197 4), 4-5. 
15 F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa .t..Q. Saraievo-~ Forei~n Policy Qf 
Austria-Hun~ary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 44. 
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Germany."16 To fully indicate that a new policy towards Germany was 
being implemented in 1871, Beust, "who was evidently not the man to 
inspire confidence at Berlin, was dismissed, and ... Count Julius Andrassy 
became minister of foreign affairs."17 For Beust had "plans for a South 
German Confederation to bind the southern states together against 
Prussia."18 But Andrassy had no desire of reasserting Austria's role in 
German affairs. Rather, as a Hungarian, he was much more concerned 
about possible threats from the eastern neighbor, Russia. Furthermore, 
Andrassy wanted to block any attempt to create a large Slavic state to the 
south of Austria. 
The Magyars felt themselves stranded in the great Slavic 
sea of Eastern Europe, and saw their only hope in the 
alliance with Germany ... His [Andrassy's] object, 
therefore, was to draw the Germans away from the 
Russians, and attach them to the Austrian side.19 
In fact, Andrassy once said, "Austria's mission remains ... to be a bulwark 
against Russia, and only so long as she fulfills this mission is her existence 
a necessity for Europe. "20 
16 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in 
International History-Theory and Reality," Journal !2f Conflict Resolution 
17, no. 1(1973):41. 
17 William L. Langer, European Alliances !m.d. Alirnments. 1871-
1.fillil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), 19-20. Count Beust, who 
came to the foreign ministry in 1866, still harbored revenge dreams against 
Prussia. During the Franco-Prussian War, he gave serious consideration 
into intervening for the French, but the war was decided too quickly. Thus, 
in order to build close relations with Berlin, Beust had to go. 
18 Bridge, 44. 
19 Langer, 20. 
20 Bridge, 50. 
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Andrassy's advancement to the position of foreign minister also 
represented another major change in Austria since their 1866 defeat. This 
major setback, while not bringing down the government as in France in 
1870, had forced a lasting change in the structure of the Habsburg 
Monarchy. The defeat encouraged the different nationalities of the 
monarchy to demand more power and rights, especially the Hungarians, 
as they constituted the largest and most organized non-German populace 
in the empire. The outcome of this campaign was the creation of the 
"Aus~leich" (settlement) of 1867. This meant that 
... the Habsburg Empire remained under a single 
ruler, who presided over a newly formed Dual 
Monarchy as emperor of Austria and king of 
Hungary. The emperor was still the supreme 
authority .... The unity of the empire was 
maintained in the three crucial fields of foreign 
policy, war and finance .... In all other respects, 
the two parts of the empire were separate.21 
Thus, "the Aus~leich was to mark the permanent defeat of the 
Germanizers in the empire, which from now on, had to be governed to a far 
greater extent ... through the non-German elements."22 What this meant 
was, that while the Germans in Austria often wanted to pursue one policy, 
the Hungarians would use their new powers to object. In these situations, 
it was usually the Hungarians who got their wish, as they were more 
successful at using their voice in matters of foreign policy. In fact, the 
21 Norman Rich, ~~ill Nationalism .and Reform, 1850-1890, 2d 
ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), 205. The Aus~leich 
also spelled out constitutional reforms, and gave jurisdiction of certain 
areas of the empire to either Austrian or Hungarian authorities, including 
areas inhabited mainly by Slavs. For more on Aus~leich, see Rich, 202-216. 
22 Ibid., 205. 
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Hungarian voice in foreign policy would usually dominate Austro-
Hungarian thinking until 1918. 
As for Russia, her decision to allow German unification had 
immediate results. "Russia had used the occasion of the French-Prussian 
War to secure the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 
Paris. "23 Thus, the Tsar was successful in destroying part of that hated 
peace treaty. But this was just the first step, as the Russians had bigger 
goals in mind. "Russia often changed her policy ... but her purpose was ever 
constant and clear--to acquire herself the control over the Straits."24 But 
while the internal reforms at home were making progress, the Tsar had to 
be mindful of the ever-growing revolutionary and radical elements within 
Imperial Russia. Many of the Tsar's foreign policy decisions were geared 
towards showing the glory and power of Russia, and to make Russians 
more patriotic and proud of the Romanov crown. In this manner, the Tsar 
hoped to lessen the danger of a revolution. 
Great Britain was also changing policies. After many blunders 
during the Crimean War, the English assumed the strategy of "Splendid 
Isolation," which meant that they would not involve themselves in another 
foreign war unless the fabric of the empire was threatened.25 Instead, it 
23 Barbara Jelavich, A Century QfRussian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 160-161. In the Black Sea 
Clauses, Russia was forbidden to maintain warships or arsenals on the 
sea. Also, the Straits were closed to all warships, but open to all merchant 
ships. For more, see Jelavich, 129-130. 
24 Baron S. A. Korff, Russia's Foreign Relations During The Last 
HalfCentuzy (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922), 114. 
25 George Earle Buckle, The Li_& Qf Benjamin Disraeli. 1876-1881, vol. 
4, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920). Later, during the 1877 
Russo-Turkish War, Disraeli described his country's policy as "one of 
focused attention on domestic and social reforms. With a new powerful 
Germany acting as a mediator on the continent, British isolation was 
assured. This attitude continued throughout the 1878 Congress. 
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Finally, the Ottoman Empire must be considered, not because of its 
strength, but because of its continual disintegration. The problems of 
nationality, religion, and corruption in the old empire were vast. Though 
the empire had formally been accepted as a Great Power in the Treaty of 
Paris of 1856, all the parties knew that the Sultan depended largely on Great 
Britain and Austria for support and protection. The 1856 treaty required 
the Sultan to undertake many reforms to strengthen his shaky regime. 
Most of these reforms were never implemented, and the situation only 
worsened. The likely collapse of the Ottoman Empire opened up questions 
concerning who would replace the Turks in the Balkans. This was the 
crux of the perpetual "Eastern Question." 
This so-called Eastern Question ... was the single major 
theme in Great Power diplomacy in this period. The 
control of the Ottoman possessions and the central 
government was constantly the object of discussion, 
negotiation, controversy, and open warfare between the 
major powers.26 
However, with the growing reports of Turkish atrocities and the refusal to 
reform, English interests in maintaining the Turkish Empire were not 
quite as vital as they once had been. This was especially the case because 
the British had gained "controlling share of the stock of the Suez Canal 
Company by the purchase of the shares of the impecunious Khedive of 
conditional neutrality--neutrality, that is so long as British interests were 
not assailed or menaced .... ", 192. 
26 Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire ... , 3. 
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Egypt, in November 1875."27 And since the canal gave England a direct 
route to India, this meant that the importance of maintaining the Sultan's 
hold of the Straits and Constantinople was not as vital as it had been. Why 
depend on the weakening Ottoman Empire when England had control of 
her own path to India? This shift in policy towards maintaining the status 
of Egypt instead of Constantinople also reflected the differences of opinion 
between the British political parties over the course of domestic and foreign 
policy. The causes of Liberalism were dominating English politics at this 
time, and since these ideals stressed social reforms and equality, the last 
thing that many people in Britain wanted was to be associated with the 
reactionary and backward Ottoman Turks. The Turks discovered this 
change in policy and attitudes increasingly as "the value of British support 
depended on the readiness and willingness of that power to maintain 
its ... role in the east."28 Even Austria-Hungary was losing interest in 
maintaining the Sultan's empire.29 Habsburg officials realized that only 
the Balkans offered an area of expansion after 1871. Furthermore, if the 
Slavic peoples in the Ottoman Empire continued to be a destabilizing factor, 
the Dual Monarchy could not allow such serious unrest on its borders. As 
a result, the Turks found themselves increasingly isolated, which made 
27 Langer, 73. 
28 Jelavich, ~Ottoman Empire ... , 6-7. This crucial change in 
British foreign policy towards the Turks will be important to keep in mind, 
as this was a factor that played a key role up through 1878. 
29 "Andrassy's standpoint throughout was ... that the Ottoman 
Empire should be maintained as long as possible ... [but if] the Ottoman 
Empire went to pieces ... he would have regarded annexation as a necessary 
precaution." Langer, 70-71. 
"The Eastern Question" even more of an important element in European 
politics. When the Sultan had little or no outside support, then his control 
over Southeastern Europe became still more uncertain and weak. 
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But while much of the attention was focused on the activities of the 
Great Powers at this time, the growing forces of nationalism in the Balkans 
could not be ignored. Particularly since the Crimean War, the various 
peoples of the Balkans were increasingly demanding their independence or 
at least autonomy from the Ottoman Turks. This was especially prevalent 
in Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. After 1856, these regions had 
received a great deal of autonomy, but this did not seem to fully satisfy the 
people. The Serbians, for example, represented the largest Slavic 
population in the Balkans, and they continued to dream not only of 
independence, but also they saw themselves as leading the way to the 
creation of a great united Slavic state. But nationalism was not just limited 
to these peoples. Despite the best efforts of Turkish authorities to stop the 
ideals of nationalism from spreading, other peoples soon learned of it also. 
A small Greek state had been formed in the 1830's and had been growing 
since; and the Greeks looked to unite all the Greeks into one nation. Even 
the isolated Bulgarians, as we shall soon see, were increasingly interested 
in the ideals of nationalism. 
What was so dangerous about this growing nationalism in the 
Balkans was the fact that each nationality had their own brand of 
nationalism and goals. This meant that these goals often were conflicting, 
and they could not be fully controlled by any of the Great Powers. Although 
the Russians thought they could direct most of the Balkan peoples by the 
dreams of Pan-Slavism, "the other Slav nations shunned the friendship of 
18 
Russia. Russian friendship or assistance meant much more domination 
than federation."30 Another writer commented "the second half of the 
Nineteenth Century witnessed the death of Slavism and the birth of a great 
variety of regional nationalisms."31 Despite this fact, the Russian Pan-
Slavs continued to believe otherwise. But the power most concerned with 
the rise of nationalism among the Slavs was Austria-Hungary. Habsburg 
officials were always concerned that a great uprising or a war for Slavic 
unity might capture the hearts of the Slavs within the Dual Monarchy, and 
so Austrian officials always had to work hard to prevent this possibility 
from happening. 
Thus, with a knowledge of the positions of the situation in Europe 
before the Congress of Berlin, we can better understand the policies 
followed at the meeting. However, before we discuss the Congress, it is 
important to follow the course of events that actually brought about the 
meeting, namely the uprisings in the Balkans which started in 1875, and 
the subsequent Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. 
30 Korff, 117. 
31 Peter F. Sugar, "The Southern Slav Image of Russia in the 
Nineteenth Century," Journal Qf Central European Affairs 21, no. 1 (April 
1961): 48. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BALKAN CRISIS, 1875-1878 
When the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856 ending the Crimean 
War, the Great Powers thought that they had solved the problems of 
Turkish-controlled Southeastern Europe by imposing required reforms on 
the Sultan. But despite all the promises and fanfare given these reforms in 
1856, most were never implemented. For several years after 1856, the 
situation in the Balkans appeared fairly calm, but in reality, it was like a 
powder keg ready to explode. Finally, the fuse went off in the summer of 
1875 "when the Turkish authorities began to exact by force the excessive 
taxes which the Christians refused to pay. At the beginning of July, they 
revolted in Herzegovina, and a few weeks later, Bosnia was also set 
aflame."32 In addition, "the Sultan's reforms merely contributed to a 
rising anger among Moslem Turks against all types of foreign 
interference. "33 Thus, two completely opposite groups stubbornly faced one 
another in the Balkans--either it was Turk versus minority or the Turk 
versus the foreign powers who demanded action towards solving the many 
problems in the Balkans. As one author mentions, "the revolts and the 
32 Mihailo D. Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 15. 
33 G.D. Clayton, Britain filld ~Eastern Question--Missolon~hi .t.Q. 
Gallipoli (Londong: University of London Press, Ltd., 1971), 122. 
Eastern Crisis had world-wide consequences for the history of all the 
Balkan peoples. "34 
The initial aim [of the revolt] seems to have been an 
improvement in the quality of Turkish rule, rather than 
independence ... [but] whether the rebels wished it or not, 
their cause was certain to be taken up by the outside 
interested parties. 35 
2) 
The fact that outside powers became involved was a key element, as 
especially Russia and Austria-Hungary had their own goals and concerns 
in the Balkans. In fact, the Balkan Crisis presented a perfect opportunity 
for Russia, because Alexander II's policy towards the Ottoman Empire 
since the Crimean War had changed from forcing its dismemberment to 
that of overseeing its natural decay.36 
However, for the Habsburg Monarchy, reports of the Balkan 
uprisings were anything but good news. It had been a long-held policy of 
Austria to maintain the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, mostly because 
it was home to many Slavic peoples. For Foreign Minister Andrassy, 
"partition of Turkey in Europe was almost as abhorrent to him as its 
domination by Russia. "37 Since the Dual Monarchy also contained many 
Slavs, the fear was that a nationalist uprising by the Slavs in the 
neighboring Ottoman Empire could spread across the border. Given the 
extent of the unrest existing in the Balkans, this danger seemed very real. 
34 Arnold Suppan, "Bosnischer Aufstand und Orientkrise, 1875-
1878," Osterreichische Osthefte 18, no. 2 (1976): 189. 
35 Clayton, 130. 
36 Baumgart, 37. 
37 Taylor, 248. 
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Therefore, Austrian Foreign Minister Andrassy's "great objective was that 
all symptoms of solidarity between the insurgents and the South Slavs in 
the Dual Monarchy must at any cost be avoided."38 The total contrast 
between Russian strategy and Austrian policy was very clear, and with this 
divergence came obvious competition and high tensions. 
In the early period of the uprisings, both Turkish authorities and the 
Great Powers kept the activities from spreading outside the Ottoman 
Empire or causing a general Balkans War, but the riots which concerned 
Austria-Hungary most closely still continued. Bosnia-Herzegovina laid 
directly on the border of the Dual Monarchy, and many of the refugees fled 
into Austrian territory, creating high tensions. For not only were many 
people fleeing into the Dual Monarchy, causing hardships and shortages, 
but also revolutionaries came with the refugees. Hence, Austria became an 
unwilling haven for radicals, revolutionary newspapers, and a place to 
store weapons to secretly ship into the rebellious regions. With this going 
on, Andrassy acted first, by writing to the Sultan "The Andrassy Note" on 
January 30, 1876. The note demanded four reforms without delay: a) the 
establishment of full religious liberty and equality, b) the abolition of tax-
farming, c) the application of the revenues gathered in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina entirely to local purposes, and d) the amelioration of the 
agricultural population. 39 These required improvements Andrassy 
38 George Hoover Rupp, A Wavering Friendship--Russia and 
Austria, 1876-1878 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1941), 84. 
39 Stephen Pierce Hayden Duggan, ~Eastern Question--A Study in 
Diplomacy (New York: AMS Press, 1970), Reprint 1902, 130-131. 
Andrassy's note contained more specifics for each of these provisions, thus, 
turn to this text for more details. 
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wanted included augmenting the basic standard of living and modernizing 
rural life. Though this message solved some of the problems of taxation, 
government, and religion, Andrassy failed to offer any solutions for the 
main issue of nationalism. But this was not surprising, for the Dual 
Monarchy had historically discriminated against the Slavs within her own 
borders. If Andrassy demanded that wholesale changes be made to 
appease the Slavs within the Ottoman Empire, then Austria's own Slavic 
population might well demand similar rights. Thus, because "The 
Andrassy Note" did not offer any worthwhile or realistic solutions, it 
received a very cool response, mostly because the desire for national self-
determination was the main issue for those who lived in the Balkans, 
whereas the issues of taxation and religion were only secondary. 
Furthermore, the other Great Powers did not have much respect for 
Austria-Hungary's attempt to solve the Balkan uprisings without the 
participation of the other powers. Thus, "The Andrassy Note" was doomed 
to failure in the minds of both the Great Powers and the Balkan nationals. 
"The Andrassy Note" turned out to be just the first in a series of 
attempts by the powers to resolve the Balkan uprisings by diplomatic 
means, rather than allowing the problem to become more serious. 
However, Andrassy's unilateral action particularly disturbed Russia, since 
she rightly considered herself entitled to play a vital part in any Balkan 
political solution. Moreover, the Austrian note was a violation of the Three 
Emperors' League ideal of acting in accordance with the other Northern 
Powers on matters in the Balkans. Accordingly, Andrassy urged another 
diplomatic move, which brought the Russian Chancellor, Prince 
Alexander Gorchakov, to Berlin for a meeting. These talks produced "The 
Z3 
Berlin Memorandum" on May 13, 1876. "This document merely urged the 
Turks to grant an armistice to the rebels and to institute reforms on the 
lines of the Andrassy Note. "40 More importantly however, "Russia 
consented to Austria's taking a portion of Bosnia [in case of an impending 
Balkans War] and reserved Bessarabia for herself .... It was the first 
success of the Bismarckian policy of partition."41 Thus, this was also the 
first sign of the eventual agreement later made in 1878, that would grant 
Austria-Hungary the right to occupy the Turkish provinces of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while Russia reacquired Bessarabia. 
The Berlin Memorandum also signified some other important points. 
The constant unrest in the Balkans showed the Austrians that the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was unavoidable, and since the 
Turks could not handle the rebellion, perhaps this was a sign that the 
disintegration of the empire might come sooner than expected, or worse yet, 
turn into a sudden collapse. To prepare for such an eventuality, Andrassy 
"could not avoid a policy which prepared the way for the acquisition of the 
two Turkish provinces [of Bosnia and Herzegovina]."42 It seems that 
Andrassy was the one most resistant to admit this, as annexing the two 
provinces would only bring in more Slavs under Habsburg rule. Since 
Andrassy was a Hungarian, he did not wish to see that happen, as such an 
acquisition threatened the political position the Hungarians achieved in 
1867 in the Aus~leich. In the Dualist system arranged by the Ause-leich, 
40 Bridge, 76. 
41 Stojanovic, 62. 
42 Rupp, 35. 
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the Hungarians held at least an equal voice in the policies of the Habsburg 
Monarchy. But there were already many Slavs in the monarchy who 
wished the empire to become a triple monarchy, so "Andrassy was 
fundamentally opposed to the inclusion of more Slavs in the Dual 
Monarchy, in which the nice balance of German and Magyar was already 
threatened."43 If Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by the monarchy, then 
that might have given the added pressure needed to force the Habsburg 
government to assume a triple monarchy structure. Andrassy wanted to 
protect the special powers that the Hungarians had finally achieved in the 
Aus~leich, and that position would be lost in a triple monarchy. But many 
other parties had been advocating the annexation of the two provinces for 
military and economic reasons. However, the most convincing argument 
for Andrassy was the fear that if Austria-Hungary did not get them, then 
the areas might be seized by a large Slavic state, possibly a Russian 
satellite. Thus, Andrassy finally succumbed to this realization, and, 
"incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina came as definite goal, and it 
became the dominant active feature of Austrian foreign policy from 1875 on 
down to 1914."44 
The memorandum also symbolized an agreement on a "policy 
pursued by Russia and Austria for over a century past ... [that was] a 
division of the [Balkan] Peninsula into an eastern and a western sphere of 
influence."45 This is in fact exactly what Bismarck wanted to do anyway, 
43 Jbid., 35. 
44 Ibid., 25. 
45 R. W. Seton-Watson, "Russian Commitments in the Bosnian 
Question and an Early Project of Annexation," The Slavonic .and EM.t 
European Review 8 (1929/1930): 580. 
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England should agree for each of them to occupy in the east--at Turkey's 
expense--a position satisfying them for the time being and preventing them 
from turning against each other."46 Hence, the two Northern Powers had 
adopted Bismarck's plan of partition without realizing it, but they did it only 
because it fulfilled both of their vital interests. 
However, when the Berlin Memorandum was submitted abroad for 
approval, it received a very stem reply from the British. London 
rejected joint diplomatic action by the powers as the 
means to settle the Balkan Crisis. She was bent on 
preserving complete freedom of maneuver and was 
determined to prove that the Three Emperors' League 
could not settle all problems by its own exclusive 
authority.47 
In many respects, England's refusal was based not so much on the content 
of the memorandum, but rather, on how the authors submitted the note to 
London, that is, expecting a favorable answer without prior consultation. 
But the answer to the plan was to pursue another strategy. Prime Minister 
Disraeli was determined to "recover the role of arbiter, by smashing the 
Three Emperors' League."48 Since Germany's unification in 1871, and 
especially since the creation of the Dreikaiserbund in 1873, Bismarck and 
46 Count Julius Andrassy, Bismarck. Andrassy and Their 
Successors (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Company, 1927), 25. It should be 
noted that this book was written by the son of the Austrian Foreign 
Minister, Andrassy, from 1871-1879. 
47 Clayton, 134-135. 
48 Ibid., 127. 
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the League had taken the initiative in solving the problems of Southeastern 
Europe. Yet, Disraeli knew that Russian and Austrian goals clashed in 
that region, and if the problems persisted, then the League would collapse 
due to a lack of agreement. Disraeli was committed to breaking the 
Dreikaiserbund throughout the Congress of Berlin and, as we will see, he 
was successful in carrying it out. Notice that Disraeli's strategy was very 
similar to the one pursued by France, as explained earlier. 
Thus, instead of submitting to the Berlin Memorandum, Disraeli 
proposed a conference of the Great Powers, but neither Russia nor Austria 
were interested in such a meeting, because both powers believed that they 
could get much more out of the war than through diplomacy. In the 
meantime, tensions continued to increase in the Balkans, especially 
between the small states of Serbia and Montenegro and the Ottoman 
Empire, as these two Balkan states also supported the insurrection 
elsewhere in the region. The impending Balkans War seemed imminent. 
On June 10, 1876, 
A treaty of alliance and a military convention were 
signed [between Serbia and Montenegro], which 
provided for the cooperation of the two states in both the 
diplomatic and military fields for the purpose of 
liberating the Balkan Christians, and especially the 
Serbs, from the Turkish yoke.49 
And finally, despite the attempts of some of the powers (mainly England) to 
stop a Balkans War, hostilities erupted on June 30, 1876. Both the Serbs and 
Montenegrens hopes this war of liberation would spread throughout the 
Balkans and liberate all the Slavs. 
49 Stojanovic, 84. 
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Such a hope was not a monopoly of the Balkans states; it was also 
harbored by many in Russia. Here, "the declaration of war ... was part and 
parcel of the grand plan of the Pan-Slav committees for a general Balkans 
rising, and was essentially the beginning of war unofficially by Russia on 
the Ottoman Empire. "50 But even those of Pan-Slavic sentiment knew that 
"Serbia was not expected to defeat the Turks, but only to sustain the 
struggle for two months. Within that time, Russia would be prepared to 
enter the war herself."51 For most Russians, Serbia represented the best 
hope for a Slavic victory, since they constituted the largest Slavic group in 
Southeastern Europe. 
In the meantime, both Russia and Austria-Hungary saw this war as 
an opportunity to gain something for nothing. This was especially true for 
Russia, but if the situation looked promising enough, the Tsar intended to 
intervene in the war to make even bigger gains. The Dual Monarchy had a 
different view. If the Balkan alliance succeeded in their war with the 
Sultan, they might gain so much land and confidence that they would 
decide to tum on Austria-Hungary itself in order to liberate the Slavs there 
as well. But at the same time, the war presented the opportunity to gain 
further Russian approval for Austria to occupy the provinces of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and, thus, gain the provinces with no effort. 
With this in mind, Austrian Foreign Minister Andrassy and 
Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov met again in July 1876, and this time 
they signed the Reichstadt Agreement. In this treaty, "the two emperors 
50 Rupp, 124. 
51 Stojanovic, 85. 
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had agreed on complete non-interference in the Serb war on Turkey."52 
Furthermore, "although there was subsequent disagreement about the 
arrangements concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia was clearly 
allowed to resume her frontiers of 1856."53 Moreover, in the event of a 
Slavic victory, Serbia and Montenegro were to gain small areas in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, while the remainder of the provinces were to go to the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Also, "Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Albania 'may' 
become autonomous states, and Constantinople a free city, while Thessaly 
and Crete fell to Greece."54 
However, such an ambitious plan never came about, as the Balkan 
states were soundly defeated. Only when the Sultan threatened the 
annihilation of Serbia and Montenegro in October 1876, did the Tsar 
demand that an armistice be granted by Turkey, and threatened that if she 
did not bring the war to an end, Russia would declare war. Thus, "the 
defeat of Serbia endangered her [Turkey's] position, and [this] forced her to 
accept the mediation of the powers," which were scheduled to meet in 
Constantinople in December 1876. 55 
The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 had another significant result, aside 
from the fact that the Balkan states lost it. 
52 Rupp, 127. 
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The main effect of Serbia's defeat was that Pan-Slav and 
Russian popular sympathy was now centered almost 
exclusively on Bulgaria; the Russians were far more 
prepared now to abandon Serbia and certainly Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to Vienna. 56 
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This is because the Pan-Slavs had long-supported Serbian efforts in order to 
achieve their objectives, but the Serbs were never able to be victorious. Once 
more, Austria-Hungary could make sure that they did not succeed in 
creating a great Slavic state. Since this was the case, then, the Bulgarians 
appeared to actually be the best choice, because of the size of their 
population, and geographically, they were closer to Russia and further 
from possible Austrian interference. Also, Bulgaria would have brought 
Russia much closer to controlling the crucial Straits to the Black Sea. 
During this war, while trying to quell other nationalist uprisings in 
the South Balkans, Turkish armies became very brutal, and committed 
what became known as 'The Bulgarian Atrocities.' "Just how many people 
lost their lives during these horrible conflicts has never been known," but 
there was definitely a great number of casualties and injuries, as well as 
property damage.57 The uncertain reports on these numbers was partly 
due to the conflicting accounts of journalists who often exaggerated, but "an 
official Turkish estimate set the casualties at 3,100 Christians and 400 
Muslims. An American investigator estimated the dead at 15,000, while 
Bulgarian historians have claimed losses of 30,000 to 60,000."58 The news of 
the atrocities spread like wildfire through the newspapers of the world, and 
56 Clayton, 136. 
57 Clayton, 85. 
58 Stavrinos, 63. 
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especially in England, where social reforms were the popular subject of the 
day. Yet, this outrage was only the worst of a series of humanitarian 
crimes. "The news of the Bulgarian atrocities, then, came just at a time 
when many people in England had already lost all sympathy with the 
Turks and their government. "59 Many people in all aspects of British 
society started questioning the wisdom of supporting a regime such as the 
Sultan's. The major voice in opposing British support of the Turks came 
from William Gladstone, the former prime minister and head of the Liberal 
Party. He spoke out many times about the atrocities in parliament almost 
immediately after the offenses became known. He also wrote extensively on 
the subject, including a short book, entitled Bule-arian Horrors. 
Gladstone's bitter attacks had profound effects on Disraeli's popularity and 
power in England. Consequently, England went to the Constantinople 
Conference in an awkward position, as the other powers, especially Russia, 
were aware of the outcry that came about in Britain because of the 
Bulgarian Atrocities. 
It was only natural that the Russians should deduce from this 
vigorous anti-Turk movement that the English government would be quite 
unable to take a strong stand against the Russian policy in favor of the 
Southern Slavs.60 
The Constantinople Conference, which was made up of the major 
powers as well as Serbia and Montenegro, came together in December 1876 
to discuss a solution to the 1876 war and the Balkan uprisings. Although it 
was a full year-and-a-half before the opening of the Congress of Berlin, 
Bismarck had the same apprehensions about this conference as he would 
59 Langer, 94. 






later have about the Berlin meeting. Bismarck believed that the 
Constantinople Conference 
would bring the existence of the Three Emperors' 
League into question, as it would inevitably deepen the 
divergences between Russia and Austria. Germany 
would be compelled to take sides, which she could not do 
without hurting one of her allies. Even if the powers 
came to an agreement, he doubted the success of their 
action in Constantinople.61 
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In many respects, the Constantinople meeting was a showdown 
between British policy and Russian ambitions. British plans at 
Constantinople were the same as usual--independence and integrity of 
Turkey, no special commercial concessions there, a system of autonomy for 
Serbia and Montenegro, and reforms in Bulgaria.62 On the other hand, 
before the conference began, Tsar Alexander II said in an address to the 
nobles in Moscow, that "if the conference failed to bring peace, and if he 
could not obtain the guarantees which he desired from the Porte, he was 
firmly resolved to take independent action."63 For its part, Austria did not 
have much respect for the conference, and assumed that a war would 
inevitably develop after the meeting adjourned. Andrassy only went to 
Constantinople to prevent Balkan self-rule, as "in that event, the road to 
Austria's expansion in the east would be closed," especially in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 64 
61 Stojanovic, 99. 
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It seems that none of the powers present at the meeting had a strong 
urge to see the conference prevail; "England was the only power directly 
concerned who was whole-heartedly anxious for the conference to succeed. 
It rested therefore exclusively upon England's representative to induce the 
Turks to submission. "65 The Ottoman Empire also had a pessimistic view 
of the meeting. They had just finished thoroughly defeating Serbia and 
Montenegro, while England had just sent warships to Besika Bay in the 
Black Sea Straits to show their support for the Turks against Russia. In 
such a position, the Turks felt no real need to submit to more reforms 
imposed by the foreign powers. This became especially apparent during the 
meetings, as when on December 21, 1876, the conference delegates were 
interrupted by the sound of cannons firing, proclaiming that a new Sultan, 
Abdul Hamid, had taken power, and he had just granted a liberal 
constitution, or at least liberal by Turkish standards. With such reforms 
installed in the new constitution, "the proposed reforms [of the conference] 
were superfluous [in the opinion of the Turks]"66 
Nevertheless, the conference continued. In the end, 
the powers as a whole endorsed Salisbury's program, 
which ... created tributary states, favored the status quo 
in Serbia and Montenegro, and ... proposed a large 
measure of administrative autonomy for Bosnia and 
Bulgaria. 67 
65 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Lim QfRobert Marguis Qf Salisbury, 1868-
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Furthermore, Bulgaria was split into two provinces north and south along 
the Balkan Mountains. Though the Russians originally wanted to create a 
single and large Bulgaria like they would attempt in 1878, Ignatiev, the 
Russian representative, knew that he had little to support such an 
enormous claim. Thus, he was willing to settle for the next best thing, a 
divided Bulgaria with a system of autonomy. Furthermore, the division of 
Bulgaria was seen by the powers as a punishment to the Turks for the 
crimes committed in the Bulgarian Atrocities. But most significantly, this 
division of Bulgaria was the first sign of the agreement made at the 1878 
Congress of Berlin. However, these plans made at Constantinople never 
became reality. The new Sultan, Hamid, refused to submit to the Russian 
and English demands. Thus, "the success of the Russian ambassador was 
complete ... [as now] Russia was left free to make war for which she had 
been anxious to find a pretext without the danger of protest of any 
quarter."68 Since the Turks had refused the demands of a united Europe, 
not even England could justify a war to defend the Sultan. This was exactly 
what the Tsar was hoping for--a war against the Turks that was sanctioned 
by the rest of Europe. 
When the conference ended on January 20, 1877, it did not take long 
for Russo-Turkish relations to degenerate even more. In addition, "the 
Russian foreign ministry found itself increasingly under open attack from 
those in the Russian public and government who wished the resumption of 
a glorious national policy."69 This was especially the case for the Pan-
68 Rupp, 265. 
69 Jelavich, A Centuzy .Qf Russian Forei~ Policy ... , 172-173. 
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Slavists, who were disappointed with the outcome of the Serbo-Turkish War 
and the Constantinople Conference. They claimed that Russia had been 
humiliated by ~e Turks at that meeting, and now it was time to finally 
strike. But in order to avoid a possible coalition of nations (as in the 
Crimean War) against Russia in the approaching war, the Tsar worked to 
guarantee himself a free hand by obtaining foreign approval, especially 
from Austria-Hungary. Representatives of the two countries met again, 
and they signed the Convention of Budapest on January 12, 1877. In it, 
Austria-Hungary promised to "observe benevolent neutrality ... and it would 
take diplomatic action to prevent intervention of other powers [mainly Great 
Britain]."70 Also, by an "Additional Convention" (not actually signed until 
March 18, 1877), Vienna "consented to Russia's annexation of Bessarabia, 
but was in her turn guaranteed the possession of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina."71 So while Russia obtained Austria's neutrality, the price 
they paid was very high. For "she [Austria] not only on paper set a bound 
and limit to Russian advances, but she made it certain that a victorious 
Russia could not .. .ignore the claims and vital interests of her hated 
Danubian rival. "72 Perhaps of all the agreements made before the 
Congress of Berlin, this is the one that was most important. Without 
German interference, Russia agreed to a limited victory, and this treaty 
also promised that the Dual Monarchy would gain substantially from the 
70 Seton-Watson, "Russian Commitments ... ," 583. For more details 
on this agreement, consult this source. 
71 Ibid. 
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Russian effort. This is exactly what Tsarist officials would complain about 
later after the Berlin Congress! 
To further secure his position, as war started with Turkey, the Tsar 
issued a circular note explaining that he had exhausted 
all the means in her power to arrive at a lasting peace by 
a common action with the Great Powers ... [and] it was 
no longer in the interest of Europe to allow the 
prolongation of such a state of things. 73 
The Tsar knew that Britain could not help the Turks because of the public 
opinion in England against the Sultan's regime. After the series of 
atrocities committed by the Turks, and as the Turks continued to refuse 
true reform, the British public would not have supported a war to prop up 
such a regime. In fact, the English public actually first supported the 
Russians, as they believed that the Turks deserved punishment. Prime 
Minister Disraeli was aware of such sentiment. So with both Great Britain 
and the Dual Monarchy neutralized, "Russia began a Turkish War 
in ... favorable circumstances, ... never had the diplomatic field been so well 
prepared."74 
73 Stojanovic, 155. 
74 Ibid., 150-151. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877 -1878 
The Tsar gave one last effort to force reforms on the Ottoman Empire 
with the proposed London Protocol, which was signed by the other 
European powers on March 31, 1877. Basically, it was the same plan as 
adopted at the Constantinople Conference, with a few variations and with 
different deadlines for administration of the reforms. However, the Sultan 
refused to accept this idea, and the long-awaited Russo-Turkish War soon 
became reality.75 The Tsar's patience had worn out, and satisfied that the 
Turks would receive no outside help, he declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire on April 24, 1877. 
Russian troops had been preparing for battle for sometime, as they 
had massed two forces (one at the Rumanian frontier, and one in the 
Caucasus) for an invasion into Turkey. While the latter army was to push 
as far into Armenia as possible and also secure the eastern coasts of the 
Black Sea, the other force looked to advance as quickly as possible into the 
Balkans, with the city of Constantinople as their ultimate goal. After some 
delays due to poor planning and execution, the first offensives were very 
successful, especially into the Balkans. Rumania, which was still an 
autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire, had helped the Russian cause 
75 Stojanovic, 142. 
by allowing passage of Tsarist troops. However, that in itself was a very 
complicated situation and will be discussed later. 
:!l 
The British government was divided on its policy concerning the war. 
Disraeli did not favor intervention on the side of Turkey unless England's 
most vital interests were at stake. 76 He was still upset about the Sultan's 
negligent attitude towards the reforms asked for by the powers, and he was 
also aware of the dislike that the English populace had for the Turks at this 
time, especially after The Bulgarian Atrocities. But Queen Victoria was 
much more determined to meet the Russian advance, as the strategic 
location of Turkey was still the key consideration for her. On the eve of the 
war, the Queen 
appealed to the feelings of patriotism ... [and] the absolute 
necessity of showing a bold and united front to the enemy 
in the country as well as outside it [the British 
Empire] .... It is not the question of upholding Turkey; it 
is the question of Russian or British supremacy in the 
world! 77 
But after much deliberation, England decided to maintain a policy of 
"watchful and conditional neutrality," naming British interests in Turkey, 
Constantinople, Egypt, and the Suez Canal as off limits to Russian 
ambitions. 78 Meanwhile, Austria hoped that the Tsar would limit Russia's 
gains to those promised in the Treaty of Budapest. 
The initial Russian successes concerned the English, as it appeared 
that they had misjudged Russian troop strength. Soon, London was 
76 Buckle, 192. 
77 Ibid., 133. The full text of the Queen's statement is available in this 
source. 
78 Rupp, 371. 
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making preliminary plans to ship a force, possibly involving also Austrian 
troops, to help defend Constantinople. 
Disraeli wanted the support of the Austrian army to 
make it clear to Russia that she would have to counter 
with armed resistance to Austria and Great Britain if 
she occupied Constantinople or refused to accept 
revision of her terms. 79 
However, just when the situation appeared lost, Turkish forces made a 
valiant stand at Plevna in mid-July, 1877, and stopped the Russian 
advance. The Turks withstood two onslaughts there and then went on their 
own offensive in August, successfully pushing back Russian lines. 
Suddenly the immediate danger to Constantinople was diminished and the 
war dragged on towards an uncertain duration and conclusion. England 
was naturally very relieved by this news, as the Russians had suffered a 
significant defeat at the hands of the Turks. 
In the meantime, for the Pan-Slavs, this war 
gave fresh impetus to the agitation of the Slavophils, who 
considered this war as their own work and believed that 
it was undertaken for the Slav Idea. Popular excitement 
stimulated by the press and at meetings was now 
general. Alexander II was hailed as the Tsar of all 
Slavs, whereas Europe was fiercely attacked. 80 
Such a campaign worried Austria-Hungary, as Andrassy hoped that such 
emotions would not engulf the Slavs within the Dual Monarchy. 
A new Russian offensive in the Balkans had to wait until September 
1877 in order for the troops to regroup. To make sure that they would 
succeed in their next attempt, the Tsar's agents had been busy negotiating 
79 Stojanovic, 219. This would not be the last time when a joint Anglo-
Austrian action was proposed by England against Russia in 1877-1878. 
80 Ibid., 154. 
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a military alliance with Rumania. Ever since the start of the war, 
Rumania had wanted to participate, but the Tsar had shunned all 
proposals for such an alliance, as he had not wanted any obstacles in the 
way of obtaining the Rumanian territory of Bessarabia. But officials in 
Bucharest knew of Russia's desire for Bessarabia, even though the 
Russians had never openly expressed these desires. This situation "caught 
the Russian diplomats in a most difficult dilemma. They needed 
Rumanian cooperation in any military advance against the Turks, but they 
also wanted a part of Rumania's territory."81 A convention had already 
been signed in April, 1877, which included the Russian pledge "to preserve 
and defend the then territorial integrity of Rumania."82 But the agreement 
never included Rumanian participation in the war on the side of Russia. 
However, after the loss at Plevna, the Tsar, needing more troops, offered 
Prince Charles of Rumania the command of military operations. Charles 
accepted this post, and abandoned "his previous demand for action. It 
should be noted that he also did not use the opportunity afforded by the 
Russian embarrassment to gain precise advantages [Bessarabia] for his 
country. "83 
With the addition of Rumanian troops, Russian forces again besieged 
Plevna. Despite another strong Turkish defense, the Sultan's armies were 
81 Jelavich, "Southern Bessarabia ... ," 204. 
82 R. Rosetti, "Rumania's Share in the War of 1877," ~Slavonic 
.and E1W European Reyiew 8 (1929/1930): 550-551. This agreement also 
allowed free passage of Russian troops, which was necessary for the 
initiation of the war. Consult this article for the full explanation of the 
Russian-Rumanian Convention of April 1877. 
83 Jelavich, "Southern Bessarabia ... ," 216. 
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badly defeated in late November, 1877. This sealed the fate of the Turkish 
cause. "The Russian army now pushed on at once to Adrianople ... there 
was no longer any Turkish army worthy of opposing Russia's march."84 
By January 1878, Tsarist troops had advanced practically unopposed all the 
way to Adrianople. This stirred Britain into action, as the fleet was ordered 
to go through the Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmora on January 23. 
In an effort to calm London, Russia signed an armistice with the Sultan in 
Adrianople on January 31. Even this did not fully quiet England, as 
parliament appropriated six million pounds for military preparations in 
early February, and 
for two months thereafter, there was a clear likelihood of 
war between Britain and Russia. Much hinged on the 
outcome of the Russo-Turkish negotiations [for peace] 
and on the Russian troop movement in the neighborhood 
of Constantinople. 85 
The Tsar countered the movement of the British fleet by sending his 
troops to the town of San Stefano, about eight miles from Constantinople. 
Finally, within sight of the Holy City of Eastern Orthodoxy and St. Sophia 
Cathedral, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878, signifying the official end to the almost 
year-long war. 
Basically, the Treat of San Stefano's 
most important feature was the creation of a new large 
Bulgarian state, larger than that of the Constantinople 
Conference, and possessing [an] Aegean Sea coast ... .In 
addition, San Stefano proposed an increase in territory 
for Montenegro and for Serbia, which was also to become 
84 Rupp, 216. 
85 Clayton, 141-142. 
totally independent, as was Rumania. Rumania was to 
cede Southern Bessarabia to Russia, and to receive in 
compensation the Dobrudja region. In Asia, Kars, 
Batum, Ardahan and Bayazid were to become Russian; 
and Turkey was to pay a large indemnity.86 
But the treaty also 
corresponded to two fundamental tendencies of Russian 
policy: it satisfied the Slavophils, who desired to see as 
many Slavs as possible liberated; it ... established her 
domination over the Straits and expelled Austria from 
the Balkan peninsula.87 
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The author of the treaty was the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, 
General Count Nicholas Ignatiev. The general had been at Constantinople 
since 1861, and had served Russia there in many capacities. From the very 
first, he was an ardent Pan-Slavist, as he "saw in the Slavophile movement 
only an expression of national self-consciousness and looked on all Slavs 
outside of Russia as natural allies against the increasing aggressiveness of 
the regenerated Teutons."88 Before 1878, the Tsar was reluctant to promote 
many Pan-Slavists to his staff, as this would only add extra pressure on 
him to embark on an extremely adventurous foreign policy in the name of 
Pan-Slavism. But the fact that Ignatiev was chosen to negotiate this treaty 
gave the Pan-Slavists hopes that the Tsar was coming more under their 
persuasion. The terms of this treaty reflected Ignatiev's definite Pan-
86 Ibid., 143-144. The indemnity amounted to about one-point-four 
billion rubles, an enormous sum, but it was designed to rectify Russia's 
dire financial straits after the war. Again, there are more specific terms of 
the treaty not explained here. 
87 Stojanovic, 233. 
88 Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "General Count N. P. Ignatiev and the Pan-
Slav Movement," Journal Qf Central European Affairs 17, no. 3 (October 
1957): 255. 
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Slavist beliefs, and for this reason, San Stefano has been called "the climax 
of his diplomatic career."89 
But while the Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavs were jubilant for 
the treaty, reaction abroad was stem and swift. For one, 
these terms, which gave Russia apparent predominance 
in the Balkans and a strong position in Asia, were in 
flagrant contradiction with other European treaties, 
notably the Treaty of Paris and the Reichstadt and 
Budapest Agreements.90 
Beyond just the legal aspects, the peace treaty really threatened England's 
and Austria's vital interests. The establishment of a large Bulgaria 
(designed to be a Russian satellite) with access to the Aegean Sea would 
mean the emergence of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean Sea, 
potentially threatening passages to India through both the Straits and the 
Suez Canal. Though the Straits to the Black Sea did not provide a direct 
path to India, the eastern shores of the Black Sea placed one in close 
proximity of the Persian Gulf and India by a land and river route. So if the 
Russians controlled the Black Sea, then this would cut the British off from 
using this possible path towards India. Also, the British thought that the 
treaty put Russia in such a dominating position over Turkey, that the 
Sultan's actual independence would be virtually non-existent, leaving him 
constantly subject to blackmail. 
For the Dual Monarchy, the creation of a large Slavic state, though 
not actually touching her borders, was feared, and was also regarded as a 
violation of their agreements with Russia, especially the recent one signed 
89 Clayton, 144. 
90 Jelavich, Th.e. Ottoman Empire ... , 111. 
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at Budapest. Thus, "both Austria-Hungary and Britain were now pressing 
for a fundamental revision of San Stefano, and in Britain's case, there was 
a clear warning that war might follow unless the Russians agreed to a 
conference. "91 
To show that they meant business, the British fleet remained in the 
Sea of Marmara, within firing range of the Russian force, which was 
encamped in the town of San Stefano. England intended to remain there 
until a satisfactory arrangement was made for a conference. In the 
meantime, tensions remained very high as each side waited for the other to 
make a move. It was here that the German Chancellor Bismarck took the 
lead in working on a peaceful arrangement between England and Russia. 
Bismarck increasingly recognized that he needed to prevent a general 
European war, as he feared that Germany would become involved, even if it 
really did not want to do so. While the two forces confronted each other, 
Bismarck contacted both sides in order to familiarize himself with each 
party's ideas, and then work for a compromise. In order to assert his own 
position, Bismarck, in a speech to the Reichstag on February 19, 1878, 
"announced that Germany sought only to be the 'honest broker'," thus 
presenting himself as a neutral mediator in Balkan affairs.92 But the 
situation was still very tense, as both England and Austria discussed 
military preparations and an alliance. 
A conference to solve the problem was first proposed by Austrian 
Foreign Minister Andrassy, but the Russians refused his suggestion it be 
91 Clayton, 144. 
92 Rupp, 458. 
held in Vienna, as they knew that a meeting held in the Habsburg capital 
could provide Austria-Hungary with possible advantages in any 
negotiations. Finally, in early March 1878, Russian Foreign Minister 
Gorchakov proposed a Congress to be held in Berlin. The other powers 
agreed, though 
Germany and England accepted Berlin with some 
reluctance. Bismarck disliked being compelled to take a 
more active part in the settlement of peace than he 
wished to; England feared lest it might lead to a more 
intimate cooperation between the three Northern 
Powers.93 
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The powers agreed to the Congress only if it limited itself to the issues dealt 
with in the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russo-Turkish War, "excluding 
from it, Egypt, Syria, and the Far East and some others."94 
Russia was still very reluctant to see the entire treaty shelved by a 
Congress, and Gorchakov soon appeared to want to distance himself from 
his own proposal for a meeting. In the meantime, the three major parties, 
England, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, continued to place proposals and 
positions before each other, while military preparations also went on until 
late May. The Tsar soon realized that Russia was completely isolated, and 
that it was in no position to fight a war, as its military and finances were 
exhausted. Using Bismarck as a middleman, England and Russia decided 
to negotiate the issues and resolve their differences prior to the forthcoming 
Congress. Lord Salisbury represented England in these negotiations. He 
93 Stojanovic, 235. 
94 Ibid., 236. This was the demand made by France, which was 
accepted by the other powers as a condition for a Congress. 
had recently become foreign secretary following the resignation of Lord 
Derby, who had lost his credibility after the Treaty of San Stefano. 
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Thus, in a May 30th protocol, Russia's Asian conquests were 
restored to Turkey, except for Batum and Kars. Also, Bulgaria was divided 
into two parts by the line at the Balkan Mountains, as the agreement made 
at the Constantinople Conference had recommended. "In return, England 
consented, though with reluctance, to Russia's taking Bessarabia, and 
promised not to contest the other clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano."95 
This protocol was quickly followed by an agreement between Britain 
and Turkey. Since Russia was to retain Batum and Kars, England did not 
feel completely safe from the risk of another Russian invasion into Turkish 
Asia or Persia. Accordingly, Turkey and England signed the Cyprus 
' 
Convention of June 4, 1878. In this agreement, 
the British government would defend by force of arms 
the Sultan's Asiatic dominions, as demarcated by the 
Congress, against any fresh Russian attack. In order to 
be in a position to execute this engagement, the English 
were to be allowed to occupy a~d administer the island of 
Cyprus, paying annually to the Sultan.96 
This brought about a desired outcome for England, because as their empire 
expanded in Africa and Asia in the 1870's, there had been shown 
the need to acquire a port either in the Black Sea or in 
the Eastern Mediterranean which would provide Great 
Britain with a naval base closer to Suez and the Straits 
95 Ibid., 255-256. For some specifics on this protocol, consult this 
source. 
96 Buckle, 298. Again, there are more detailed provisions within this 
agreement, and they are explained in this source. 
than Malta ... [and thus], the lines of imperial 
communications would be assured.97 
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The last pre-Congress arrangement came on June 6, 1878, when 
"Britain and Austria-Hungary made a preliminary agreement concerning 
the new Bulgaria and the Austrian position in Bosnia ... [but] common 
ground between Britain and Austria-Hungary was limited to Turkey in 
Europe."98 
Hence, at last, the issues before the Congress were decided upon, and 
perhaps more importantly, many problems were solved by the pacts 
involving Russia, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. For this 
reason, author William Langer pointed out that some historians have said 
that "the Congress of Berlin was at bottom a farce, because all the decisions 
had been made beforehand."99 However, Langer disagreed with this 
opinion. He stated that 
Bismarck would have been only too glad if this had been 
true ... the agreements made beforehand were all of a 
vague nature, and all of the powers chiefly concerned 
were determined to get what they could out of the 
Congress.100 
This is a crucial element to keep in mind for the Congress of Berlin, as it 
seems to have been a commonly held attitude, especially by Russia. Despite 
all of the preliminary agreements that it had with England and Austria-
97 Jelavich, ~Ottoman Empire ... , 113. Many historians treat the 
Cyprus Convention as a separate matter from the Congress. A special 
monograph has been written on it: Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and~ 
Cn>rus Convention Policy Qf .18..'.ra (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1934). 
98 Clayton, 145. 
99 Langer, 153. 
100 Ibid. 
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Hungary, the Tsar still wanted the most out of the Congress that he could 
get, and he looked to Germany to help him achieve it. In his view, 
Germany owed Russia a favor for staying neutral in Germany's wars of 
unification. Now it was time to return those favors. At the same time, 
agreements outlying the general focus of a major conference were (and still 
are) very common, as it was necessary to limit the discussions to a definite 
field, otherwise delegates could force such complicated negotiations, that 
the whole meeting would have been in danger of failure. Such high-level 
meetings were showcases, where diplomats came in their best possible 
positions, while still pursuing an eventual agreement. Thus, with the 
stage set, a vast array of distinguished personalities convened in Berlin for 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN OF 1878 
The Congress, which convened on June 13, 1878, "was one of the 
most brilliant political assemblies of modern times, not unworthy of 
comparison with the congresses of Vienna and Paris."101 But unlike these 
previous congresses, never before had there been so many nations with the 
distinction as a Great Power; and Berlin included dignitaries for peoples 
that were not represented at the other meetings. 
The British delegation, possibly the most competent of all the groups, 
included Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Foreign Secretary Lord Robert 
Salisbury, and the English Ambassador to Berlin, Odo Russell. They were 
most set on changing the Bulgaria created in the Treaty of San Stefano, and 
were even willing to make some minor concessions in Asia to do it. Yet in 
many respects, they were in the best position of all the powers, as it was 
mostly their determination that brought on the Congress, and also, they 
were the most prepared for war. 
Russia countered with the veteran Foreign Secretary Alexander 
Gorchakov, who was obviously past his prime, not to mention the fact that 
he and Bismarck had experienced a strained relationship for several years. 
The Russian Ambassador to London, Count Peter Shuvalov, thus, stepped 
to the forefront of their delegation. Also, the Ambassador to Germany, 
101 Langer, 150. 
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Count Paul Oubril, attended, but he made no real contribution. Notice that 
Count Ignatiev, the creator of the Treaty of San Stefano, did not come to 
Berlin. This showed that even the Russians realized that the treaty "was 
the greatest stupidity that we could have made."102 Nevertheless, the 
Russians, especially Gorchakov, still hoped that a "Big Bulgaria" could yet 
be saved during the meetings. 
Austria-Hungry sent a respectable delegation, consisting of Foreign 
Minister Andrassy, the Austrian Ambassador to Berlin, Count Alois 
Karolyi, and Baron Heinrich Haymerle as an adviser. Their policy was set 
on acquiring the Turkish provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they looked 
to England and Germany to support their cause. 
Although France swallowed its pride by coming to Berlin for such a 
meeting, it sent her Foreign Minister, William Waddington and her 
ambassador to Germany Count Saint-Vallier, and Despres as an adviser. 
The French took a very cautious course in Berlin, and saw themselves as a 
second mediator to Germany. 
Meanwhile, Italy was represented by Foreign Minister Lodovico 
Corti, an experienced diplomat, and Count de Launay, the Italian 
ambassador to Berlin. The Italians hopes to show their new strength by 
gaining some kind of prize in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, and 
mostly followed Britain's lead to do so. 
The Turks sent delegates as well, yet they did not bother to send a 
strong contingent to a meeting that would prove to be a humiliation. Their 
102 Medlicott, The Con~ess Qf Berlin ... , 40. This was a statement 
that Shuvalov made before the Congress met. 
main goal was to leave Berlin as little damaged as possible, and they, too, 
looked to England for help. 
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The small Balkan states also sent representatives, none of whom are 
important enough to name, primarily because they came as observers who 
could make appeals and suggestions, but they did not have real voting 
power. On a whole, "nationality as a principle found little, if any, sincere 
support from the Great Powers."103 Instead, political and strategical 
considerations were given top priority. 
Although the German delegation included their Foreign Secretary 
von Bernhard Bulow and the Ambassador to Paris, Prince Chlodwig 
Hohenlohe, there was no doubt that Bismarck was definitely the dominant 
member of this contingent, and, in fact, of the whole Congress. Knowing 
his expertise, the representatives quickly elected him as president of the 
Congress, even though this created a situation the chancellor wanted to 
avoid. He knew that both Russia and Austria expected him to vote for their 
side, and he did not want to be placed in that dilemma in the presence of all 
the other diplomats. In order to avoid this, he even suggested that French 
Foreign Minister Waddington be elected as president of the proceedings. 
Somehow, Bismarck needed to bring the Congress to a successful 
conclusion, and at the same time, satisfy all of the participants. This was 
especially the case with Russia and Austria-Hungary, since Bismarck 
wanted to maintain the Three Emperors' League. In nominating 
Waddington, the German chancellor tried to put France in a place of 
responsibility, especially if either of the other Northern Powers' goals failed 
103 Henry F. Munro,~ Berlin Congress (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1918), 30. 
to be realized. However, the delegates did not want it, and Bismarck 
became president of the Congress. His role became crucial in making the 
meeting a success. In all, "twenty representatives ... participated, three 
from each of the powers invited, save Italy, which sent only two."104 
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Despite all of the preliminary agreements, the Congress' main goal 
was still to change the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano, and "to secure in 
the interests of European peace, the creation of a reorganized Turkish 
Empire which should depart from the status quo ... as little as possible."105 
However, since there were many questions to resolve in the treaty 
concerning Europe and Asia Minor, which ones would get priority? 
Bismarck answered this in short order, as he saw Europe in a very tense 
situation. He took the initiative with the statement, "let us deal with the 
great things that concern England, for England is quite ready to go to war 
with Russia."106 No one could deny this, and so at only the second meeting 
of the Congress, the delegates moved to resolve the most pressing issue 
first, the "Big Bulgaria" created at San Stefano."107 
The "Big Bulgaria" consisted of many problems, especially in the 
opinion of England and Austria-Hungary. The new Bulgarian coastline 
touched both the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, and since the new nation 
would presumably be a Russian satellite, this would allow the Russians to 
104 Ibid., 8. 
105 Medlicott, The Con~ess .Qf Berlin ... , 133-134. 
106 Buckle, 315. 
107 As the Congress started, Salisbury wrote in a letter, "if this 
Bulgarian question can be satisfactorily settled, all the other matters will 
quickly find their level [of importance]." Cecil, 281. 
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avoid the Straits into the Black Sea, and give the Tsar's navy direct access to 
the Mediterranean Sea by using Bulgarian ports. This would solve the 
long-standing problem of the Russian Navy being bottled up in the Black 
Sea. But as long as the British controlled the Straits and the Mediterranean 
Sea, they could not allow the Russians to pose such a threat. Allowing the 
Russians a port in the Aegean Sea also would endanger England's route to 
India, as Russia could conceivably blockade both the Straits and the Suez 
Canal. Na val concerns were not the only problem involved in the "Big 
Bulgaria." Her new borders included many peoples besides Bulgarians. 
Greeks, Turks, and other Slavic peoples would find themselves inside the 
new state, mostly against their will. Western Europeans attached special 
significance to the Greeks, because of their cultural and historical 
importance and, thus, did not want them included in the projected borders. 
Likewise, the nationality problem was of great concern to Austria-
Hungary, since the new Bulgaria represented the realization of the large 
Slavic state which they so dreaded. Andrassy argued that the "Big 
Bulgaria" violated the Budapest Agreement of 1877, in which Russia had 
promised not to create such a large Slavic state. Britain also stipulated that 
these new borders would threaten the Ottoman Empire, reducing it to a 
puppet state of St. Petersburg. With most of the other powers agreeing with 
these criticisms, Russia had little chance of maintaining its dream of a 
"Big Bulgaria." In fact, all the Great Powers followed England's lead on 
the Bulgarian issue. Even the Balkan representatives at the Congress did 
not support the "Big Bulgaria," because the proposed state included lands 
which the other Balkan states also wanted. 
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Thus, the discussions turned to redrawing the Bulgarian border at 
the Balkan Mountains, with the Sultan maintaining political and military 
control of the southern province (East Roumelia), a system adopted at the 
Constantinople Conference. However, the situation had changed, as the 
Russians had just won a costly war, and for that reason, the Russian 
delegation at first refused to consider a small state. They also did not want 
the Turks to regain East Roumelia, even if the area was to be autonomous. 
Thus, when Shuvalov sent the new proposals to the Tsar for consideration, 
the British made arrangements for a special train to take the English 
delegation home on June 21. Bismarck intervened here, as he saw the 
Congress collapsing before his eyes. In order to save the Congress, 
Bismarck had dinner that night with Prime Minister Disraeli, and they 
discussed both British demands and possible concessions. Later, with 
French mediation, it was decided "that the Sultan might garrison troops on 
the frontier between East Roumelia and Bulgaria, but not billet them on the 
population ... [and] The Russian occupation of Bulgaria was to be limited to 
nine months."108 
This agreement then helped solve several related problems at the 
same time. While the smaller Bulgaria was to receive independence, the 
Sultan received political and military control over Eastern Roumelia under 
four main conditions, though that province was also to exercise a great deal 
of autonomy.109 Russian troops were to help establish a new government in 
108 Langer, 155. 
109 Medlicott, Conruss 2fBerlin ... , 56. The Sultan was given very 
strict guidelines on how he could use his troops here, including the 
requirement of informing the Great Powers when he chose to do so. See the 
limitations cited here. 
55 
Bulgaria, and eventually in April, 1879, the Bulgarian Assembly elected as 
their hereditary prince, Alexander of Battenberg. For 
the Treaty of Berlin had excluded from the throne 
members of the Russian ruling family, but ... he 
[Alexander of Battenberg] was a German prince, his 
father had served in both the Russian and Austrian 
armies, and he was related by marriage to the English 
royal family. In short, his election could be counted 
upon to win general approval.110 
However, the Russians soon became disenchanted with the prince, as he 
pursued a foreign policy very different from that of the Tsar, and before 
long, Russian officials looked for ways to remove him from office. 
As for the rest of the Bulgarian settlement at Berlin, the Turks were 
given permission to fortify the border on the southern side of the Balkan 
Mountains for necessary security. This breakthrough still left the borders 
"in somewhat vague terms, it was agreed that it [the borders] should be left 
to a technical commission which was to base its decisions primarily on 
strategic and geographical considerations."111 Later, as the Congress 
neared an end, the representatives accepted the borders as suggested by the 
commission. The division of Bulgaria into two parts and the decision on its 
government was a great victory for England which received aid in this, as 
"Andrassy's vigorous and consistent support of the British was ... the 
decisive factor in the situation."112 However, there was a price for this 
support, namely that England would support Austria-Hungary's desire to 
110 Langer, 336. 
111 Medlicott, Con~ess Qf Berlin ... , 56-57. 
112 Ibid., 57. 
occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina. These provinces became the next question to 
be considered by the Congress. 
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Since the start of the Balkan uprisings in 1875, the Dual Monarchy 
had become increasingly interested in acquiring these two Turkish 
provinces to the south. Andrassy had been long reluctant to do so, as this 
would only have brought more Slavs into the monarchy, something which 
he and his fellow Hungarians did not really want. But after the Turk's 
decisive loss to Russia in 1878, there was no longer any hope of the Sultan 
maintaining his hold on either province. This meant that either Austria-
Hungary would gain Bosnia-Herzegovina, or they would be divided up 
between Serbia and Montenegro. The latter was not acceptable for 
Andrassy. He still looked for a way to secure the regions without outright 
annexation. In the time preceding the Congress, Andrassy had 
approached the British with the idea of establishing a military occupation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since the Dual Monarchy supported 
England's proposals on Bulgaria, this seemed a reasonable trade. 
Moreover, both the Sultan and the Tsar could approve an occupation of the 
two provinces, because an occupation was not as definite and final as an 
outright annexation. Thus, on June 28th, it was Salisbury who proposed 
the occupation idea, after Andrassy had described the bad conditions in the 
provinces. 
However, both Turkey and Russia resisted the proposal. The Turks 
were still opposed to any further loss of territory, no matter how it was 
done. Salisbury himself "described the occupation as a 'left-handed 
annexation'."113 The Turkish refusal on this matter continued until July 
113 Ibid., 83. 
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13, when Andrassy secretly declared "that the occupation would only be 
temporary, and expressly reserving legal sovereignty over the provinces to 
the Sultan ... the final details were reserved for a separate Austro-Turkish 
agreement."114 Such an agreement did not actually come until April, 1879. 
Russia was equally interested in the territorial settlement in 
neighboring Montenegro. Shuvalov "emphasized the great importance 
which Russia attached to a satisfactory solution of this question."115 This 
attitude actually showed the difficult position into which the Russians had 
brought themselves. The Treaty of San Stefano had not only caused united 
opposition from the west, but also most of the Balkan peoples resented it. 
While Russia had spoken eloquently in past years about Slavic unity, the 
borders drawn at San Stefano satisfied the Russians, but only aroused 
mistrust among the Slavs. Too many people would end up in a country 
with a different nationality, and, small Slavic nations feared the large and 
possibly ambitious Bulgaria that Russia wanted to create. After the Treaty 
of San Stefano, all the Slavic nations but Bulgaria and Montenegro looked to 
the west for protection. Russian officials realized this, and put special 
emphasis on helping the cause of Montenegro. In order to win Russia's 
approval of Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro was 
allowed to win some concessions. However, even the settlement in 
Montenegro had to please the Dual Monarchy. 
Montenegro had secured the recognition of her 
independence and a few miles of coastline, but was not 
allowed to have vessels of war ... and [they] had to 
114 Bridge, 92-93. 
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surrender the greater part of the territory allotted to her 
by the San Stefano Treaty.116 
Also, the Austrians proposed to place an army garrison in the 
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Sandjak region. "The Sandjak was to Bosnia and the Herzegovina what the 
Straits were to the Black Sea: a gateway to the east which must be kept 
open."117 The Sandjak was vital for communications between the Dual 
Monarchy and the two occupied provinces. If the region fell to a Slavic 
state, the Habsburg armies would be in potentially serious danger. This 
region, too, was included as an area for Austro-Hungarian occupation. 
The Congress of Berlin also dealt with problems affecting many other 
nations of Southeastern Europe. One of the tragic but realistic decisions 
made at the meeting concerned Rumania and the region of Bessarabia. No 
one could doubt the Rumanian contribution to the Russian victory over the 
Turks, especially in the November 1877 campaign at Plevna, where extra 
Rumanian forces helped the Russians break the determined resistance of 
the entrenched Turkish forces. In fact, the Rumanians declared 
independence in May, 1877, and "although _the move was greeted with great 
enthusiasm within the country, it received a negative reception abroad."118 
Their declaration of independence was not recognized by anyone, for the 
western powers knew that then the war started, that Russia would most 
want to gain Bessarabia as compensation. And yet if the province fell 
116 Ibid., 96-97. 
117 Bridge, 97. Included in the garrison was the entire area known 
as the Sandjak of Novibazar, an important passage in the Balkan 
Mountains, which was necessary for an army to maintain while in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
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under Russian control, the Tsar would be pleased and the west would not be 
threatened. If the powers had recognized Rumanian independence, then 
the Russians could not have obtained Bessarabia from the Sultan, since it 
was actually Rumanian territory. Then if the Russians occupied Rumania 
in order to finally obtain Bessarabia, how would the Great Powers be able to 
help them other than through war? No power was willing to go to war to 
protect Ru.mania. Finally, at the Congress itself, the Rumanian 
representatives, Bratianu and Kogalniceaneu, pleaded their case. Though 
they found sympathy, no one was willing to support them, mainly because 
of the problems surrounding Bessarabia. Perhaps this decision, more than 
any other, showed that the delegates at the Congress had adopted 
Bismarck's plan of partitioning the Ottoman Empire between the powers, 
in order to satisfy the Great Powers and avoid a possible war. Concessions 
for nationalism did not fit into Bismarck's partition plan. This is another 
example of Bismarck's habit of practicing the power politics involved in 
Realpolitik, which, in his mind, only included the Great Powers as 
noteworthy for consideration. 
So while the Russians finally realized their long dream of 
reacquiring the strategic and lush region of Bessarabia, the Congress 
looked for ways to soothe Rumanian disappointment. Therefore, in 
compensation for the loss of Bessarabia, the Rumanians obtained 
recognition of their independence and the region of Dobrudja, a strip of land 
south of Bessarabia. However, there was little comparison between the two 
regions, as Bessarabia was an area of rich soil bordering part of the Danube 
River, while Dobrudja had little if any value. Nonetheless, the Rumanians 
had to accept what they were offered, but after this experience, "distrust [of 
00 
Russia] became the foundation of Rumania's foreign policy in the following 
decades." 119 
While Montenegro received small gains along the Adriatic coastline, 
some adjustments to Serbia's borders were also made, though far less than 
they would have obtained from the Treaty of San Stefano. However, both 
states were granted outright independence, and were no longer required to 
pay tribute to the Sultan. Meanwhile, Greece acquired some regions in 
Macedonia that were not granted to Bulgaria. Therefore, while the small 
Balkan states did gain some territories at the Congress of Berlin, it was for 
the most part less than they would have received by the San Stefano Treaty. 
At the same time, the Balkan states were generally pleased with their 
treatment at Berlin, while some had actually been outraged at the Russians 
for their treatment at San Stefano. The diplomatic reversal tended to create 
strong relationships between most of the Balkan states with the western 
powers, at least on a temporary basis. 
The fact that Russia acquired the strategic province of Bessarabia 
raised the problem of controlling the mouth of the Danube River. This was 
a serious problem, especially for Austria-Hungary, which depended on the 
Danube River for much of its commerce. Needless to say, the control of the 
river had important military implications as well. As long as the Turks 
controlled the mouth of the Danube, and as long as the Habsburgs had good 
relations with them, the Danube was considered safe. However, with 
Russia in control of the river's mouth, a new system was necessary that 
could satisfy everyone. 
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Instead of placing the river under the domination of one country, the 
Danube was made neutral below the Iron Gates. To govern the river, a 
European Commission, created in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was 
reestablished, this time composed of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and 
Rumania. The Dual Monarchy was given the authority to assume the 
responsibilities of maintaining the Iron Gates, keeping the river navigable, 
and collecting tolls from all ships at the Gates. Eventually, this European 
Commission was made a permanent body in 1883. "The settlement was 
thus a Habsburg victory throughout."120 
A British-Russian confrontation resurfaced at the Congress 
concerning the control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which connect the 
Black and Mediterranean Seas. For centuries, Russia desired to have the 
Straits, but always had been denied that wish in some way or another. 
Great Britain had usually been the main force behind the protection of the 
Straits. In 1878, Russia had come very close to capturing the city of 
Constantinople, and with it, the strategic Straits. But after the "Big 
Bulgaria" was lost at the Congress, and with it, Russia's bid to control the 
Straits, the Russian delegation at first pressed for the Straits to be opened to 
all warships. However, this would have actually been detrimental for the 
Tsar, because the British could come in and threaten Russia's Black Sea 
fleet and cities. British dominance of the seas was well known, and on the 
other hand, between 1856 and 1871, the Russians had not been able to 
station a fleet in the Black Sea, so the Tsar's naval presence there in 1878 
was still small. Hence, the Russians soon realized that leaving the Straits 
120 Jelavich, ~Ottoman Empire ... , 123. 
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closed to all warships at least secured the Russian position on a short term 
basis. Therefore, on July 11, Shuvalov agreed that "the closure of the 
Straits is a European principle, and that the stipulations laid down in this 
matter in 1841, 1856, and 1871, now confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, are 
obligatory upon all the powers."121 And so with this decision, the control of 
the Straits remained with the status quo: in the hands of the Turks, and 
with no advantage to any one power. 
Another difference between Russia and Great Britain concerned 
some of the regions and cities in Asia Minor that Russian armies had 
conquered in the Russo-Turkish War. The fact that Russian territory and 
influence was growing ever southward concerned the English, who knew 
that Russia desired to have access to Persia and the Persian Gulf, in order 
to obtain a warm water port. This would be especially important if the Tsar 
was unable to gain control of the Straits into the Black Sea. The possibility 
of the Russians acquiring a Persian Gulf port would seriously threaten 
Britain's position in India, and would surround the Ottoman Empire in a 
vise. Though this was still only a possibility, when the Tsar moved into 
some key positions along the Black Sea and into Northern Armenia, it was 
a sure sign of his long-term intentions. The most important city that the 
Tsar claimed was Ba tum, a crucial city on the Black Sea, especially if it 
were used to its military potential. 
However, the British delegates recognized that they had already 
received nearly every demand that they desired from the Congress, and 
they were "willing to admit that the acquisition of Batum ... did not 
121 Langer, 158. 
ffi 
constitute in itself an adequate ground for war."122 This was especially the 
case, since the Straits had been secured. Thus, a compromise was reached 
concerning Batum. Russia was allowed to keep the city of Ba tum, but it 
was "to be free and exclusively commercial."123 In this manner, the 
Russians would be satisfied in gaining Batum, but in having it, the city 
would not prove to be of a military danger to England's position in India. 
And along with Batum, Russia also gained Kars and Ardohan in Armenia, 
without any restrictions. 
As an added measure of insurance against Russian advances, the 
British came to a conclusive agreement for the acquisition of the island of 
Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. This gave England more credibility 
in its claim to protect the Turks from further threats. That is, the Sultan 
would have a firmer control of a smaller region, which would seemingly be 
better than only weak control of a vast unstable empire. 
The only other area that the Congress touched upon was Tunis, as it 
appeared that since the British had acquired the controlling shares of the 
Suez Canal in 1875, then Egypt would soon become part of the British 
Empire. The French were not too pleased with this prospect, especially 
since they helped finance the canal. So, "Bismarck ... apparently suggested 
to the English the possibility of squaring the French by leaving them a free 
hand in Tunis ... Waddington returned to Paris contented to have Tunis in 
his pocket."124 Though no formal arrangement was made at Berlin 
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concerning Tunis, France was convinced that the area would soon be 
theirs. Since Tunis was to be assigned to France, this meant that the 
Italians' best hope of gaining something at Berlin came to naught. 
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At last, on July 13, 1878, with all of the delegates in full dress 
uniforms, the Treaty of Berlin was signed. Overall, the Congress of Berlin 
had achieved its goals. On a short term basis, the Congress had stopped an 
impending war between Russia and Great Britain. Also, the meeting had 
altered the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano, and thereby stopping Russia's 
attempt to decide the Eastern Question unilaterally. 
In looking at the decisions made at Berlin, especially the division of 
Bulgaria, the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, limited gains by 
the Tsar and the Balkan states, combined with the English occupation of 
Cyprus, "The Congress of Berlin was humiliating and disastrous [for 
Russia]. It really appeared that Russia had fought a great and difficult war 
in order to secure advantages for Austria and England. "125 In short, 
"Russian diplomacy had nothing to show but the retrocession of Southern 
Bessarabia and the acquisition of a strip of Armenia in return for a costly 
campaign."126 These facts were reflected by the reception that the 
diplomats received at home. 
Two days after the treaty was signed "the British plenipotentaries 
returned to London where a triumphant reception awaited them. Prime 
Minister Disraeli declared that he had brought back "Peace with 
Honor'. "127 Turkey had once again been put on an apparently firm footing. 
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Moreover, the British had denied the Three Emperors' League the 
opportunity of solving the Eastern Question alone. No doubt now existed 
that any serious alteration of the situation in the Balkans had to be 
approved in London as well. In fact, "whereas the Congress of Paris [1856] 
had destroyed 'The Crimean Coalition', the Congress of Berlin almost 
recreated it."128 The disastrous impact that the Congress had on the 
Dreikaiserbund was exactly what Disraeli hoped for. Since the Berlin 
Memorandum of 1876, the prime minister had looked for ways to lessen the 
effectiveness of the alliance, and if possible, to put its partners at odds with 
one another. Later, Disraeli wrote 
next to making a tolerable settlement for the Porte 
[Sultan], our great objective was to break up, and 
permanently prevent, the alliance of the three empires, 
and I maintain there never was a general diplomatic 
result more completely effected.129 
On the negative side 
the resounding achievement of 1878 weakened the 
effectiveness of British policy in the long run; for it led 
the English public to believe that they could play a great 
role without expense or exertion ... [or] without finding 
an ally.130 
Of course this effect on English attitudes would not be known for several 
years. So for a period immediately after the Congress, the meeting was 
undoubtedly judged a great success for Great Britain. 
128 Taylor, 258. 
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written in November 1880. 
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Austria-Hungary also came out of the Congress in a strengthened 
position, as it gained the right to occupy the two desired provinces, as well 
as being granted a strong voice on the control of the Danube River, 
especially at the Iron Gates. Nevertheless, Andrassy received much 
criticism at home. 
Although the treaty was ultimately ratified, the 
campaign [in Austria-Hungary] against Andrassy in 
the press, the court, and in both parliaments finally 
made his position untenable. Opposition to his foreign 
policy was particularly strong in Hungary, when the 
occupation was objected to ... [because it] was believed [it] 
would accrue to the Slav element in the empire.131 
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On top of this, the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not handled with 
great efficiency, despite coming to a full agreement on the occupation with 
the Sultan in April, 1879. Habsburg armies were met with resistance, and 
this caused Austro-Turkish relations to suffer. With the additional Slavs 
now coming under Habsburg control, "both German and Magyars saw only 
the potential threat to their predominance within the Dualist [Aus~leich] 
structure."132 Eventually, all of these critidsm pushed Andrassy to resign 
his post as Austrian Foreign Minister in August, 1879. 
For Bismarck, the Congress went about as well as could be expected. 
He worked hard to keep the meeting from falling apart, and he was given 
credit by the other diplomats for running the sessions in a speedy and 
business-like manner.133 Furthermore, his idea of partitioning the 
Ottoman Empire was adopted by the other powers as a way to end the state 
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of anarchy that had persisted in many parts of the Empire, and the 
partition was seen as a method of preserving European peace. Bismarck 
strongly believed that he did the best he could by securing for the other 
members of the Dreikaiserbund their most fundamental goals at the 
Congress. He knew that Russia had to have Bessarabia, some gains in 
Armenia, and the creation of at least some sort of Bulgaria. At the same 
time, he was also aware that Austria-Hungary needed to prevent a 
dangerous situation from developing in the Balkans. In principle, he was 
exactly right, but, perhaps, he did not fully comprehend the true feelings of 
the others, especially Russia. Instead of looking at what they received, the 
Tsar, Gorchakov, and the Pan-Slavs saw only what they did not get. It was 
this group who felt that their costly war against Turkey had gained more 
for England and the Dual Monarchy than themselves. In looking for 
reasons for this outcome, Gorchakov put the blame on Bismarck, claiming 
Bismarck had backed Austria-Hungary on all the important issues. 
However, in looking at the decisions made at the Congress, it appears that 
Russia received about as much as was possible. For "Russia was also 
negotiating on the assumption that she could not resort to war, and 
Bismarck was quite prepared to give her the full benefit of his diplomatic 
skill and influence."134 The whole point behind Bismarck's policy of 
partitioning Turkey was to divide it in an equal fashion, and not give any 
one country a dominant position. In fact, that was the whole idea behind 
the need to change the unrealistic Treaty of San Stefano. If Russia intended 
to try to get any more than she did at Berlin, then she would have had to do 
it through war with Britain and, probably, Austria-Hungary (perhaps even 
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against some other countries such as Italy). No one, not even Bismarck, 
could have obtained more for Russia than they received peacefully in the 
Treaty of Berlin. If Bismarck had pushed for any more, it would have made 
him appear biased towards Russia, and probably isolated Germany with 
Russia. This was the last thing that Bismarck wanted to do. Instead, 
Bismarck was strongly convinced that he got what he could for the Tsar, 
and even if he had pressed for more, it certainly would have been turned 
down by the other powers at the Congress. 
The important point is, however, that this was not how the Tsar and 
many other top Russian officials saw it. They were very displeased by the 
outcome at Berlin. Perhaps, as we shall see, that it was this attitude that 
changed the course of history. 
CHAPTER VI 
REACTION TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN 
AND THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE 
Though Russian officials knew before the Congress that the San 
Stefano pact could not be saved, and though they had made agreements 
with England and Austria-Hungary before the Congress on border 
compromises, many Russians, especially those who harbored Pan-Slavic 
ideals, thought that Russia had been humiliated at Berlin by their supposed 
friend. Russians saw that "Bismarck started by backing Austria whole-
heartedly at the Berlin Congress, meeting all her demands ... where Russia 
had spent thousands of lives and millions of pounds, Austria spent only ink 
and paper. "135 In reality, 
the [Russian] diplomats, who were anxious to exonerate 
themselves of responsibility, found it much more 
convenient to lay the blame on Bismarck, who owed 
Russia so much and had done so little to help her 
out ... [so that] the Tsar was convinced that the whole 
meeting had been 'a European coalition against Russia 
under the leadership of Prince Bismarck.'136 
This attitude went beyond limited Russian government circles. Later, the 
Paris correspondent for~ London Times wrote an article in November, 
1878, entitled: "The Kaiser Has Forgotten His Promise of 1870."137 What the 
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correspondent was referring to, is the neutral role that Russia played 
during the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, which allowed Prussia to 
complete German unification. Kaiser Wilhelm I told Tsar Alexander II 
that he would never forget this, and implied that Germany would someday 
pay her back.138 Thus, in the Tsar's eye, at the time when Russia needed 
her most, Germany abandoned her before all the Great Powers to see. The 
Tsar did not hold back his anger. 
In August 1878, Alexander II sent Wilhelm I two very stem letters. 
In these letters, the Tsar complained that despite Russia's long-time 
friendship and devotion to Germany, she had not supported Russia at her 
time of need, and that now, the Tsar could not guarantee peace between the 
two nations.139 In the meantime, 
the newspapers of St. Petersburg and Moscow indulged 
in violent recriminations with those of Berlin ... [and] in 
the reorganization and redistribution of the Russian 
armies that followed the war with Turkey, the troops 
stationed in Poland were strengthened to an extent that 
excited alarm in Germany.140 
Bismarck felt suddenly threatened by an angry and emotionally charged 
neighbor, one that had tremendous strength. Rumors persisted of a 
Russian-French alliance, or a Russian-Italian alliance. This rapidly 
developing crisis was critical into pushing Bismarck to what had already 
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been proposed--a military alliance between Imperial Germany and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Austrian Foreign Minister Count Julius Andrassy had first formally 
proposed such an alliance as early as 1872, and, instead, had to settle for 
the much weaker Three Emperors' League between Germany, Russia, and 
the Dual Monarchy. Bismarck had declined Andrassy's offer in 1872, as a 
military alliance, especially against Russia, was then not necessary for 
Germany. However, times had changed, and the Russian reaction to the 
outcome at Berlin was indeed very hostile. Secondly, Austrian officials who 
were not pleased with Andrassy's performance at Berlin, forced his 
resignation. Vienna's pro-German policies, characterized by Andrassy, 
seemed threatened. With these factors in mind, a pact with Austria-
Hungary seemed to Bismarck to ensure close relations with the Dual 
Monarchy. Talks began in September, 1879, and before the Austrian 
foreign minister's resignation became effective, Bismarck and Andrassy 
came to a quick agreement. After only two meetings, the historic pact was 
finally signed on October 7, 1879.141 
The actual treaty itself was fairly straightforward, as perhaps it 
reflected the rapid development of heightened tensions. Written in five 
articles, the pact made the following stipulations.142 First, if one of the two 
141 This is the date when the pact was given formal approval by the 
Kaiser. The actual signing occurred on September 24, and then went 
through a review in Berlin, which will be discussed shortly. For more, see 
Coolidge, 165-172. 
142 Most of my sources have the pact in five articles, although one has 
it in three. Perhaps it is just a matter of how the authors divided the 
agreement. See Coolidge, 219-221. 
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empires were attacked by Russia, then the other party was bound to assist 
with a full military force, and the conclusion of peace would come only with 
mutual consent. Secondly, if one of the two powers were attacked by 
another force, the other party would respect neutrality. However, if that 
force was supported by Russia, then the other power would then be required 
to assist with a full military force. Also, the treaty was to cover a five-year 
period. One year before it was due to expire, the parties would analyze 
whether the conditions existed for a renewal. If no formal renewal talks 
were held, then the treaty would be considered extended for a three-year 
period.143 Furthermore, the treaty was to remain secret, unless mutually 
decided upon. However, if Russia were to continue its threatening mood, 
then the Tsar was to be warned that an attack on one power was considered 
an attack on both. And lastly, the treaty was to be validated by the two 
sovereigns, and would be ratified within fourteen days of their 
signatures.144 Outside of this, the alliance had two simple objectives, "first, 
the defense of the status quo created by the Berlin Congress, and secondly, a 
mutual insurance against Russia. "145 Yet it should be noted that while the 
specific contents of the treaty were secret, enough information was released 
on the treaty so that the Great Powers would generally know that such an 
143 "Not until the year 1907 was the special agreement made whereby 
it was henceforth to be automatically extended at the end of each three-year 
term." Dr. Alfred Franzis Pribam, The Secret Treaties Qf Austria-
Hungary, 1879-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 
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alliance existed between Germany and Austria-Hungary. For the treaty 
would not act as a deterrence if the other Great Powers, especially Russia, 
did not know something about it. But unknown to the two German empires 
at the time, 
the Austrian-German Treaty, from October, 1879, to the 
outbreak of the World War, [would] constitute the basis 
of action of the Central Powers in all questions of foreign 
policy, most especially as concerns their relations to 
Russia.146 
Not even Bismarck could have foreseen in 1879 the treaty's eventual 
significance. 
The treaty received two completely different reviews within the 
German government. Bismarck was very enthusiastic. He was received by 
cheering crowds at home and in the Dual Monarchy, as the alliance struck 
a very close accord with German nationalists, conservatives, Southern 
Germans, and Catholics. Bismarck used this support as an argument for 
the 1879 alliance.147 Despite Bismarck's determination to form the 
alliance, which will be more fully analyzed later, he received stiff opposition 
from Kaiser Wilhelm I. 
The Kaiser found it almost impossible to sign a military alliance 
against the Tsar, his friend and cousin. The sovereigns had just recently 
come together for a meeting on September 3, 1879 in Alexandrovo (in 
Russian-controlled Poland) to discuss the tensions and 
misunderstandings. With this candid meeting still fresh in his mind, 
Wilhelm I believed that a military pact against Russia would be seen as a 
146 Pribam, 6. 
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betrayal of their September discussions. If there was to be any military 
agreement, then it should be three-way alliance with Russia included. 
Wilhelm even threatened to abdicate rather than agree to such a pact. 
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However, Bismarck was just as convinced that the alliance was 
justified, and he also threatened to resign. Since the chancellor had played 
such a prominent role at the Congress of Berlin, Wilhelm I could ill afford 
to have him leave now, and have the complicated Berlin Treaty supervised 
by someone who was inexperienced. Furthermore, Bismarck was 
supported by all the Kaiser's main diplomatic and military advisers. Even 
the Crown-Prince took the chancellor's viewpoint. Under such pressure, 
Wilhelm finally, but reluctantly, endorsed the alliance.148 The only 
concession that the Kaiser obtained was that the treaty would be secret, and 
he would inform the Tsar himself as to the scope of the treaty.149 
The reaction of most other powers to the Dual Alliance was very 
favorable. British Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, in a speech in 
Manchester in October 1879, called the news of the pact "good tidings of 
great joy."150 This reflected the anti-Russian feeling that existed in the 
west after the Tsar's threatening actions during the Russo-Turkish war, 
and later following the Congress of Berlin. This corresponded to 
Bismarck's prediction that the alliance would be warmly received, 
especially by England, which had very close relations with both Vienna and 
148 For reading the discussion on this, see: Bismarck, 285-286. 
149 Coolidge, 170-172. 
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Alliance signified an obvious split between the members of the 
Preikaiserbund, which was one of Prime Minister Disraeli's major goals 
since the start of the Balkan uprisings. 
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Berlin. In fact, Austria continuously tried to persuade the British that they 
should join the alliance. In the opinion of Heinrich Haymerle (Austrian 
Foreign Minister after Andrassy), "a coalition of central powers with 
England would maintain peace, for it would be so strong that no other 
grouping would dare to challenge it."151 But Bismarck was afraid that 
such an alliance would be too threatening to Russia, so "his advice to 
Haymerle was to ... do enough to maintain British friendship."152 
However, it was not just heightened tensions that pushed Bismarck 
to sign the Dual Alliance. After the Congress, Bismarck knew that a pact 
of some kind was necessary in order to maintain German security. 
Lacking any natural barriers to invasion, Bismarck saw Germany's newly-
won position of strength and size as still uncertain. Thus, between the 
Berlin Congress and the alliance's approval, he made a very thorough 
analysis on his options--should he ally with Russia or Austria?153 Those 
were his main choices. What were the advantages and disadvantages of 
each? He was well aware of the importance of his decision, for it would 
likely signal Germany's direction in foreign affairs for many years to come. 
Bismarck gave very serious consideration to creating a military 
alliance with Tsarist Russia. In fact, the Russian Ambassador to London, 
Count Peter Shuvalov, had proposed such an agreement just before the 
Congress of Berlin. Bismarck declined the offer then, and after the 
151 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone. and~ Concert .Qf Europe 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1956), 43-44. 
152 Ibid., 63. 
153 The chancellor goes through this review in his memoirs; 
Bismarck, 276-282, 286-296. 
Congress, the chancellor maintained the same reasoning for not 
combining with Russia.154 From a German point of view in 1879, 
Bismarck's judgment was excellent. The chancellor believed that by an 
alliance with the larger Russia, Germany would have automatically put 
herself in a second-class status to the naturally dominant and rather 
adventurous power. Furthermore, the Tsar might use the situation to his 
advantage, requiring Germany to join in costly wars in the Balkans, 
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Persia, or in the Far East, none of which were in Germany's interests. 
Furthermore, given Germany's secondary role as an ally, the Tsar might 
dissolve the treaty at any time, perhaps even during a war. And since 
Russia's relations with the west were not good in 1878, especially with 
England and Austria-Hungary, Germany would be in the position of 
isolating herself with Russia, giving the Tsar even more power and 
influence over Germany. Bismarck knew, too, that a German-Russian 
alliance would inevitably be directed against Austria-Hungary, and the 
Dual Monarchy would as a consequence be forced to go to France for an 
alliance of their own. This possible Paris-Vienna connection, or "Catholic 
Coalition" as Bismarck called it, was the chancellor's worst nightmare. It 
was not a far-fetched possibility. France and Austria had mutual interests, 
for they both might want to settle scores with Germany (for the wars of 1871 
and 1866 respectively). Bismarck knew that such an alliance would be a 
154 Bismarck, 260. Even after the Congress, Shuvalov was interested 
in close ties with Germany, as he did not blame Bismarck for the Berlin 
Treaty. However, he was never completely successful in converting Tsar 
Alexander II to his viewpoint. 
grave threat, and, as long as this "Catholic Coalition" was possible, 
Germany could never feel safe.155 
TI 
Moreover, Bismarck found Russian political decision-making too 
unpredictable, as a growing number of Pan-Slavists, led by the Russian 
Ambassador to Constantinople, General Nicholas Ignatiev, were involved. 
The Pan-Slavs dreamt of unifying all Slavic people under Russian 
leadership, with their further goal of restoring the seat of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church to Constantinople, whence it was forced to flee after the 
Turks took power. The Pan-Slavs had no love for Germany, and they 
certainly wanted to destroy the Dual Monarchy or, at least, liberate the 
Slavs from the yoke of Vienna. In fact, "a most characteristic trait of the 
Russian Pan-Slav movement; it was prompted much more by hatred of 
Germany than by love of Slavs."156 Bismarck's distrust was not 
unjustified, as the Pan-Slavs had most strongly pushed for the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877 and were most upset by the Treaty of Berlin. Besides 
these political reservations, Bismarck found the growing revolutionary 
movement in Russia as potentially threatening to Germ.any, while at the 
same time, possibly making Imperial Russia an unstable ally. 
For Bismarck the Tsarist regime was to be retained as a strong 
friend within the Three Emperors' League. This way, the "Three Northern 
Powers" could work together to maintain conservative principles while also 
cooperating to defeat Socialist and Liberal causes. In this way, the Dual 
Alliance, in Bismarck's eye, was designed to eventually make the 
155 Ibid., 286-287. 
156 Korff, 97. 
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Dreikaiserbund stronger, possibly even an actual military alliance. 
However, this view was not shared by Austria-Hungary. Andrassy "would 
not have anything to do with an agreement 'a~· with Russia. Again, 
such a monarchical league would appear to be directed against France."157 
Much of Bismarck's rationale for Austria-Hungary was the same as 
those in his decision against Russia, only reversed. Since France's defeat 
by Prussia in 1871, the Dual Monarchy had become increasingly pro-
German. This had been exemplified by their choice of foreign minister in 
1871, Count Andrassy. However, Austrian officials were not satisfied with 
Andrassy's performance during the Congress of Berlin. A new foreign 
minister, Baron Heinrich Haymerle, was named. Haymerle was a 
"cautious, unadventurous career diplomat...[and] he was determined to 
continue Andrassy's anti-Russian policy."158 Bismarck wanted to 
encourage this obvious vote of confidence by allying with the Dual 
Monarchy. In this manner, Bismarck kept Vienna in the pro-German 
camp, and thus, avoided the "Catholic Coalition" from coming about. 
Bismarck was right that the Dual Alliance would appeal to Germans 
on both sides of the border. The reception that Bismarck received in both 
countries proved the point. However, Bismarck was rarely the sentimental 
type. His choice of the Habsburgs as an ally was based on Realpolitik, one of 
Bismarck's trademarks.159 
157 Bridge, 106. 
158 Ibid., 108. 
159 Bismarck, 27 4. "The questions of the popularity in Germany and 
the Monarchy are for me a secondary importance, and were only further 
justifications to consider for the eventual outcome." 
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In considering Austria-Hungary, at least since 1875, it was becoming 
apparent that 
Germany could not afford to see Austria completely 
defeated and deprived of her position as a Great Power. 
If that were to happen, the Habsburg Empire would 
undoubtedly be disrupted, and even if Germany were 
strengthened by the acquisition of the German provinces 
of the empire, she would find herself alone between the 
powerful Tsarist Empire on the one side and a vengeful 
France on the other .160 
Since Russia posed a threat to Austria-Hungary, Bismarck saw the new 
alliance as assuring the government of the Dual Monarchy that it would 
have help in the face of a possible Russian attack.161 If a Russo-German 
alliance had been signed, then the Dual Monarchy would have almost 
certainly been partitioned at some time in the future, possibly after a very 
bloody war. Bismarck was not interested in such a scenario. 
A strong element of Bismarck's reasoning rested on the conviction 
that he could use the treaty to restrain Habsburg ambitions. Although 
Russian designs in the Balkans were well known, the Dual Monarchy was 
not without their own. For Bismarck, his success in foreign policy 
"depended on his ability to so direct the Eastern Question as to avoid 
collision between Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the 
Orient."162 To prevent such a conflict, Bismarck emphasized the alliance's 
defensive nature, and that Germany would come to the aid of Austria-
160 Langer, 175-176. 
161 Bismarck, 278. However, this threat seemed more a concern to 
Bismarck than to the Habsburgs. Perhaps it is because as early as 1876, 
Russia had asked Germany to remain neutral in the event of a Russian-
Australian conflict; Bismarck, 242. 
162 Andrassy, Bismarck, Andrassy ... , 18. 
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Hungary, but not sacrifice Berlin's own interests. Thus, the pact was not a 
blank check to allow Habsburg meddling in the Balkans, but rather it was 
designed by Bismarck to retain the Dual Monarchy's security and status as 
a Great Power. For unlike a German-Russian alliance, any Berlin-Vienna 
pact placed Germany as the unquestioned dominant party, a position that 
Bismarck relished and one that he was intent on keeping. 
Bismarck also saw other uses for the alliance. It was seen as a 
"stepping-stone towards a new Three Emperors' League," and before that 
came about officially, Russia's isolation would force the Tsar to rely on 
Germany as his mediator with other powers.163 The isolation of Russia 
would force the Tsar to come to a more realistic assessment of the Treaty of 
Berlin, and lead him back into Germany's camp. "Her [Russia's] choice of 
allies remained limited. Republican France was unacceptable ... England 
as before could not be considered. There remained the two German 
courts."164 And as Bismarck envisioned, the Tsar once again did seek 
friendship with Berlin. 
For the Dual Monarchy, the signing of the Dual Alliance was a 
major victory, the accomplishment of a goal which they had first proposed 
in the early 1870's. The alliance gave them a strong position, and it boosted 
their prestige abroad, which had sagged since their 1866 defeat by Prussia. 
Obviously, tying themselves to the German Reich met with a great deal of 
163 Bridge, 107. 
164 Jelavich, A Century Qf Russian Foreign Policy ... , 186. At this 
stage, Alexander II could not consider an alliance with France because of 
the major ideological differences. This attitude would prevail in St. 
Petersburg until 1894, which changed under different circumstances and a 
different Tsar, in part due to the need for loans that France supplied. 
enthusiasm, and it proved to the non-Germans of the Monarchy that 
Vienna had finally decided to abandon any lingering dreams of becoming 
involved again in German politics. 
However, there were some differences of interpretation of the treaty 
between Berlin and Vienna. Austrian officials thought that the alliance 
gave them strength in their Southeast European pursuits rather than 
acting as a restraint on them. Furthermore, an obvious pro-Austrian 
viewpoint in Berlin implied that it would be a permanent relationship, 
making any further close ties between Russia and Germany impossible. 
Thus, while Bismarck saw the treaty as the first step towards a closer 
Three Emperors' League, Andrassy saw the Dual Alliance as "the 
tombstone of the Three Emperors' League."165 This explained Austrian 
reluctance to renew the League until 1881, as Austria-Hungary "saw few 
advantages for herself in the arrangement."166 
Andrassy did obtain a major concession in the alliance before he 
agreed to it. Originally, Bismarck had wanted the Dual Alliance directed 
against both Russia and France. But "Andrassy had been scrupulously 
careful in the negotiations to avoid anything that might cast a cloud over 
his relations with London and Paris," and agreeing to a military alliance 
against France would have done just that.167 The Dual Monarchy had no 
serious quarrel with Paris, and saw no need to create one. This attitude 
disturbed Kaiser Wilhelm I. He did not understand why Germany had to 
165 Bridge, 107. 
166 Jelavich, A Century Qi' Russian Forei~ Policy ... , 187. 
167 Bridge, 107. 
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help Austria in case of a Russian attack, but Austria did not have to aid 
Germany in case of an attack from France. However, Andrassy did not 
agree, and if there were to be an alliance, it "must be clearly directed 
against Russia."168 To this, Bismarck finally agreed, but with obvious 
disappointment. 
The treaty caused the Tsar to discover just how isolated he really 
was. In fact 
the need for a serious attempt at reconciliation with 
Germany had been realized by the Russian government 
before it received definite evidence of the Austro-
Hungarian-German rapprochement, ... [and it] supplied 
the primary reason for the new phase in Russian 
diplomacy.169 
The Tsar was aware that historically 
the alliance of the three northern courts and the 
traditional Russian-Prussian link guaranteed the safety 
of the Russian western border,. .. as long as these 
agreements held ... Russia was safe from the threat of a 
direct invasion by a hostile coalition.170 
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The Russians now realized that their reaction against the Treaty of 
Berlin and Bismarck was unrealistic, and that, it was futile to try to change 
the Berlin Treaty. Russia had been terribly weakened by the war with 
Turkey both militarily and financially. It was in no position to attack either 
Germany or Austria-Germany, especially if England intervened on behalf 
of the Dual Alliance. Thus, the Russians were forced to endeavor to 
resurrect the Three Emperors' League, an effort which succeeded in 1881. 
168 Ibid., 106. 
169 Medlicott, Con~ess QfBerlin ... , 385. 
170 Jelavich, A Century .Qf Russian Forei~ Policy .. ., 291. 
A further guarantee of German friendship came with the Reinsurance 
Treaty of 1887, which pledged both Germany and Russia to maintain 
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cordial and peaceful relations. Yet the 1879 treaty had left a permanent 
scar on relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, since the treaty was "a 
proof that he [Bismarck] had given his preference to Austria; that the 
Russians had to assume a permanent anti-Russian bias in his policy as 
long as it remained in force. "171 If Bismarck had wanted to show that he 
was not pro-Austrian at the Congress of Berlin, then the Dual Alliance 
seemed a contradiction. To renew the treaty only reinforced Russian 
suspicions of Germany's attitude. It is perhaps true that the initial signing 
of the Dual Alliance was not a mistake, as it did bring the Russians back 
into the fold. But it seems logical that the renewed Three Emperors' 
League in 1881 should have voided the Dual Alliance. How could the Dual 
Alliance powers truly have maintained close relations with Russia, if they 
also had a major military alliance directed solely at Russia? Few 
friendships, no matter their history or close ties, can function in such a 
shaky and tense status. Russia either should have been included in the 
military agreement in 1881, or there should have been no alliance at all. 
Bismarck should have said to Vienna--either you accept a three-way 
military agreement with Russia, or there will be no alliance. Germany had 
that power, and Austria-Hungary would have been forced into a 
compromise. In this manner, no one would have received preferable 
treatment. Either both would have been included in the alliance, or none. 
But Bismarck was afraid of trying this approach, for fear that Vienna 
111 Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone, ... , 43-44. 
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would ally itself with France instead. Therefore, Bismarck tried to balance 
his relations with Vienna, while also maintaining a tense friendship with 
Russia. This would not satisfy the Tsar forever. 
In other respects, the Dual Alliance represents both the first modem 
permanent alliance between two Great Powers, and also significantly, the 
longest existing military pact before World War I. Of course, most of these 
facts were not realized in 1879, but they must be considered, as "the October 
treaty was soon followed by further developments in Bismarck's alliance 
system, which defeated William Gladstone's dream of a united Europe."172 
This destruction of the Concert of Europe, first created during the Congress 
of Vienna of 1815, showed Bismarck's theory on maintaining European 
peace. Bismarck's 
philosophy of international life remained fundamentally 
combative and pessimistic, and he could discover no 
reliable basis for national survival other than the 
accumulation and maneuvering of superior force.173 
In short, the Dual Alliance was the first sign that the peace of Europe 
depended on the threat of war, rather than on a mutual and equal 
cooperation for peace as envisioned in the Concert of Europe. This 
philosophy is the same theoretically as that which has dominated post-
World War II Europe, in the effort to maintain peace on the continent with 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact Coalitions, and the threat of "Mutual Assured 
Destruction." 
And also unknown to Bismarck in 1879, the Dual Alliance would 
have eventually become a traditional part of European diplomacy in the 
112 Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone, ... , 2. 
173 Ibid., 11. 
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later Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, since it lasted until 1918. 
Especially for Berlin, as the relationship between Germany and Austria-
Hungary formally set up in the treaty became their most dependable one in 
foreign affairs. 
A main question still unsolved here is the question whether alliances 
necessarily cause counter-alliances. One can not say that it always does, 
but the Dual Alliance was unique, in that it was the first pact between two 
Great Powers signed in a time of peace. Thus, it can be said that the Dual 
Alliance started the pattern of alliances, which 
were defensive or deterrent in nature, designed to 
supplement one's military power, deter aggression, and 
aid in defense in the event the deterrence failed. As in 
the Nineteenth Century, military preparedness and 
planning in advance were absolutely vital to the 
successful conduct of war.174 
The rapid victories of Prussia over Austria in 1866 and France in 1871 
showed that no longer could one wait until the war was under way before 
gaining an ally. The war might already be decided before an ally could be 
found. Offensive dominance in military technology made preparation a 
vital part of defense and strategy of the time. With the offensive weapons 
having such an advantage, the Dual Alliance, while pretending to be a pact 
for defensive security, actually posed an offensive threat to Russia. 
This brings us to an important consideration: how did Tsarist Russia 
perceive the alliance? Especially, if it was a secret treaty, how did the Tsar 
know that it was only defensive in character? Though the alliance was 
secret, enough information about its existence was passed on to Prussia to 
174 Jack S. Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior, and 
Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," Journal Qf Conflict Resolution 25, 
no. 4 (1981): 606. 
00 
make the Tsar worry about the treaty's exact contents and character. What 
might have been considered a defensive war for Germany or for the Dual 
Monarchy might not have been seen as that to Russia, or to anybody else for 
that matter (as in 1914). Thus, although the Dual Alliance was not 
intended to do so, it in fact created worse problems. The completion of the 
treaty reinforced Russia's suspicions that at the Congress of Berlin, 
Germany threw its complete support behind Austria-Hungary, and now 
with the 1879 treaty, Bismarck intended to continue that policy. Thus, it 
appeared that as long as the Dual Alliance was in existence, Russo-
German (and certainly not Austro-Russian) relations could never be truly 
good again. The Three Emperors' League or the Reinsurance Treaty were 
not enough--the Germans had made their choice, and in doing so, proved 
(by keeping the Dual Alliance) that Berlin did not trust the Russians. This 
development seems strange, as Bismarck always made sure that he had an 
option in choosing between Russia and the Dual Monarchy. This was one 
of the goals for Bismarck in creating the Dreikaiserbund. However, in 
signing the alliance, Bismarck himself destroyed that freedom of choice 
available to him in the Dreikaiserbund by siding with Austria-Hungary in 
1879. 
While alliances in general do not inevitably create rival groupings, 
the Dual Alliance of October 1879 "generated counter-alliances, which 
generated further mistrust and tensions, leading to an arms race, and the 
further polarization of the alliance structure."175 Despite the best effort of 
Russia to recreate close ties with Germany, they never felt totally safe. 
Eventually, the Tsar's regime felt compelled to look for another friend to 
175 lbid., 582. 
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protect against this threat on the crucial western border. Although many 
other things had to occur between 1879 and 1894 to prompt the Romanovs to 
turn to the French Republic, Russia finally completed this step with their 
alliance with France in 1894. This was just exactly what Bismarck had 
wanted to avoid. As a result, the stage was set for a European conflict. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Dual Alliance of October 1879 between Imperial 
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire is an early factor in the 
origins of the First World War, the alliance played an important part in the 
roots of the war. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 showed that as long as a 
strong Germany existed, Berlin's relations with Russia would be much 
different and more difficult than before unification. Even so, close relations 
were not impossible. However, from the Russian perspective, Chancellor 
Bismarck took up and supported the Austrian (and English) cause at the 
Congress. Though Tsar Alexander II over-reacted to the Congress, it was 
Germany's decision to sign the Dual Alliance, thereby creating the first 
obvious split in relations between the Three Northern Powers. If the Tsar 
acted hastily in his response to the Treaty of Berlin, perhaps Bismarck did 
so too, in October of 1879. Since the treaty was regularly renewed 
thereafter, relations between the three empires steadily drifted further 
apart. As it then eventually became apparent that Germany was going to 
remain pro-Austrian, the Russians had little choice but to go to Paris in 
1894, especially as German military and economic strength grew 
enormously in the 1890's. Such a French-Russian Alliance would not have 
been necessary without the existence of the Dual Alliance. If Bismarck 
made an especially serious mistake concerning the Dual Alliance, it 
consisted in the fact that the treaty was always renewed without the 
addition of Russia. If that had come about, then perhaps the course of 
history might have been quite different. The "Great War" of 1914-1918 
might have been avoided, or, at least, fought with different alliance 
systems. 
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But the question is, would the Dual Alliance have come about without 
the Congress of Berlin? Possibly, but not as early as 1879. This can be said 
by considering the relations between the Three N orthem Powers between 
1871 (the unification of Germany) and 1878. Though there were some 
significant differences between the three, in particular, between Russia 
and Austria-Hungary, relations had never been so tense as to bring the 
situation to a war. Rumors of a possible war were one thing, but actual 
preparation for war was another. The Congress of Berlin, however, 
represented the first time that Russia went beyond discussing a war, and 
actually started serious preparations for hostilities. Thus, the Congress of 
Berlin appears to be the key factor that brought on the eventual split 
between Germany and Russia concerning the place of Austria-Hungary in 
Balkan politics. For it was Austria-Hungary that brought on the problems 
between Berlin and St. Petersburg. But for the Dual Monarchy, there would 
have been no serious quarrels between Germany and Russia, at least none 
severe enough to threaten relations. Before the Congress, Bismarck had 
been able to keep the other two powers reasonably content in the Balkans. 
As the 1878 meeting neared, Bismarck had realized that the Habsburg 
Monarchy presented a more stable ally, but he still participated in the 
Congress with the intent to do what he could for Russia. Since the German 
chancellor found at the Congress that Russia could never be fully satisfied, 
and after the Tsar threatened war, Bismarck concluded he had no choice 
00 
but to secure the position of both Germany and the Dual Monarchy with a 
military alliance. This decision would dominate German foreign relations 
until 1918. 
Actually hostilities did not actually erupt between the three states 
until 1914, a prime point of origin for the problems in 1914 began with the 
1878 Congress of Berlin. If historians are looking for a root cause for "The 
Great War", then the 1878 Congress of Berlin must be considered as one of 
the most crucial ingredients in the final decisions in August 1914. This 
fact, more than any other, is why the 1878 Congress of Berlin should be 
studied carefully as a true watershed in European diplomatic history. 
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